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PLENARY POWER IN THE MODERN 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE* 
CATHERINE Y. KIM** 
For the past quarter century, the “plenary power” doctrine of 
immigration law—under which courts suspended ordinary 
standards of judicial review to defer to the political branches on 
questions relating to the exclusion, detention, and deportation of 
noncitizens—has been in decline. The conventional account 
attributes this development to the expansion of constitutionally-
protected individual rights across public law cases. This Article 
assesses changes in immigration law from a different perspective, 
one having less to do with individual rights than with 
constitutional structure. It focuses on the role that delegation 
concerns have played, contextualizing the judiciary’s willingness 
to review immigration decisions within a broader administrative 
law project to strengthen judicial checks on the growing authority 
of agency officials across the regulatory state. 
This perspective helps explain one of the enduring puzzles of 
contemporary immigration law—why courts continue to defer to 
immigration decisions in some cases but not in others. Rather 
than rejecting the notion of a plenary power outright, courts have 
concluded that such power cannot be freely delegated to 
unelected agency officials. This insight carries important 
implications for the rights of noncitizens. A theory of judicial 
review premised on delegation concerns rather than individual 
rights offers little protection against actions by Congress and 
perhaps also the President. Moreover, where the relevant actor is 
an agency official, judicial scrutiny rooted in structural concerns 
may be as skeptical of administrative decisions favoring 
noncitizens as those harming them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For much of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, federal 
courts categorically denied review over government decisions that 
would plainly violate constitutional rights outside of the immigration 
context, citing the government’s “plenary power” to exclude, deport, 
and detain noncitizens. Pursuant to this doctrine, courts allowed the 
government to exclude noncitizens on the basis of race,1 deport 
residents on the basis of their political opinions,2 and indefinitely 
detain aliens without hearing.3 Today, by contrast, courts routinely 
exercise robust review over immigration decisions, and not 
infrequently reverse government policies.4 In doing so, they have 
largely retreated from plenary power principles, declining to exempt 
immigration law from generally applicable standards of judicial 
review.5 
This doctrinal shift has not escaped scholarly notice, and 
commentators have been discussing the “demise” of plenary power 
for decades. The dominant scholarly explanation for this decline has 
attributed it to broader public law developments expanding the scope 
of constitutionally protected individual rights.6 Pursuant to this view, 
 
 1. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“If .	.	. the 
government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the 
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to 
be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed .	.	.	. [Such a] 
determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893) (sustaining legislation requiring the deportation of Chinese 
nationals who fail to prove lawful presence through the testimony of “at least one credible 
white witness”). 
 2. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595–96 (1952) (sustaining 
deportation of aliens based on prior membership in the Communist party). 
 3. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215–16 (1953) 
(rejecting due process challenge to indefinite detention without hearing for legal 
permanent resident seeking reentry). 
 4. See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983–84 (2015) (reversing decision to 
deport); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683–84 (2013) (same); Judulang v. Holder, 
565 U.S. 42, 51–52 (2011) (same); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514 (2009) (reversing 
denial of asylum); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (rejecting indefinite 
detention of noncitizens without hearing); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450 
(1987) (reversing denial of asylum). 
 5. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era 
of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 111 (2015) (observing 
“mainstream[ing]” of immigration into ordinary domestic law and challenging practical 
import of plenary power doctrine); cf. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 588 (2017) (discussing normalization 
of immigration law). 
 6. Peter Schuck and Hiroshi Motomura were among the first to characterize the 
changes in immigration law in this manner. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After 
a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 
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the emergence of fundamental rights recognized in cases like Brown 
v. Board of Education7 and Goldberg v. Kelly8 made it increasingly 
difficult to justify exempting an entire category of government 
decisions from judicial scrutiny; due process, equal protection, and 
free speech rights had finally penetrated immigration law.9 This 
individual-rights explanation, however, provides at best an 
incomplete account of contemporary immigration law. While modern 
courts have rejected plenary power principles in many cases, they 
continue to invoke the doctrine in others. As a descriptive matter, the 
conventional account fails to explain the plenary power doctrine’s 
continued, albeit circumscribed, persistence. 
This Article examines the vast changes in immigration 
jurisprudence from a different perspective, one having less to do with 
individual rights than with constitutional structure. It focuses on the 
role that delegation concerns have played in the judiciary’s growing 
willingness to review immigration decisions.10 
Across the modern regulatory state, national policy decisions 
increasingly are made by agency officials, notwithstanding the 
constitutional mandate vesting legislative authority exclusively with 
Congress. Article I not only requires that federal laws be enacted by 
 
100 YALE L.J. 545, 564, 577, 595 (1990) (pointing to “gravitational pull” of equality and 
due process norms in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (tracing changes to emerging recognition of “universal rights 
based upon individuals’ essential and equal humanity”). Since then, a near consensus has 
emerged, attributing modern developments in immigration law to a growing judicial 
solicitude toward the rights and interests of aliens. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002) (describing a “radical shift” in immigration law to extend due 
process protections to aliens); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race 
Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57–58 
(1998) (contending that due process and equal protection norms trump plenary power in 
recent immigration cases); Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution 
Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L. REV. 879, 882 (2015) (contending that courts have integrated 
due process doctrine into immigration law in a manner that enhances individual rights); 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional 
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 297–99 (1984) (identifying departures from plenary power 
principles rooted in equality and due process norms); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is 
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1301 (2011) (arguing that recent developments 
afford “more robust judicial protection of the rights of immigrants”). 
 7. 347 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 8. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 9. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 6, at 566–67.  
 10. In an essay published ten years ago discussing Judge Posner’s immigration 
jurisprudence, Adam Cox called for scholarly exploration of the role that non-delegation 
concerns play in modern immigration law. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and 
Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1687 (2007). This Article responds to that call. 
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the democratically elected members of Congress;11 it also provides 
that such laws must undergo a carefully calibrated set of procedural 
requirements prior to enactment.12 These measures are designed to 
ensure that federal laws be subject to public accountability, are 
carefully deliberated, and enjoy a sufficiently broad range of support 
to mitigate the risks of factionalism, tyranny, and arbitrariness.13 Yet 
Congress today routinely delegates the power to promulgate wide-
ranging policy decisions to administrative agencies, including our 
nation’s immigration agencies.14 While the Supreme Court has been 
notably unwilling to enforce non-delegation requirements directly, it 
has developed a series of doctrines to promote non-delegation norms 
indirectly—largely through the sub-constitutional field of ordinary 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§	1–3 (vesting legislative power in Congress and specifying 
electoral process for composition of House and Senate); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to 
transfer to others, the essential legislative function with which it is .	.	. vested.”). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	7 (setting forth procedural requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment).  
 13. John Manning describes the constitutional goals served by the lawmaking 
procedure as follows: 
[I]t makes it more difficult for factions .	.	. to capture the legislative process for 
private advantage, it promotes caution and restrains momentary passions, it gives 
special protection to the residents of small states through the states’ equal 
representation in the Senate, and it generally creates a bias in favor of filtering out 
bad laws by raising the decision costs of passing any law. 
John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 239–40 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of 
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001) (describing how 
federal lawmaking procedures protect separation of powers norms); Jonathan R. Macey, 
How Separation of Powers Protects Individual Liberties, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 813, 819–20 
(1989) (describing normative goals of constitutional lawmaking requirements). 
 14. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 12–13 (2014) 
(criticizing modern delegations of administrative power for violating constitutional 
structural requirements); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Modern Administrative 
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1994) (same); John F. Manning, Constitutional 
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 612, 618 (1996) (identifying divergence between modern administrative state and 
separation-of-powers principles); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422 (1987) (describing modern administrative state’s failure to 
incorporate sufficient checks and balances to constrain agency discretion). 
This Article focuses on the non-delegation problems implicated by administrative 
agencies’ exercise of policymaking authority. Doctrinal efforts to constrain agencies’ 
exercise of adjudicative authority are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854–56 (1986) (analyzing 
congressional delegation of adjudication power to agencies). For a discussion of the 
structural constitutional problems raised by agency adjudications, see Mila Sohoni, Agency 
Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1569, 
1571–72 (2013).  
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administrative law—to cabin the delegated discretion of agency 
officials.15 As in other regulatory fields, courts have begun to apply 
these doctrines to closely scrutinize agency decisions in the 
immigration context.16 
This perspective contextualizes contemporary immigration law as 
part and parcel of a larger administrative law project to strengthen 
judicial checks on the growing authority of agency officials across the 
regulatory state. On this understanding, courts have not necessarily 
rejected the notion of plenary power outright but have concluded that 
such power cannot freely be delegated to unelected agency officials.17 
This insight carries important implications for the rights of 
noncitizens. First, an exercise of judicial review motivated primarily 
 
 15. See Manning, supra note 13, at 223 (discussing influence of non-delegation norms 
on evolution of doctrines of administrative deference); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 491 (2010) 
(arguing that non-delegation concerns animate much of contemporary administrative law); 
Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 
520 (2015) (characterizing emergence of administrative law as “an act of constitutional 
restoration, anchoring administrative governance firmly within the constitutional tradition 
of employing rivalrous institutional counterweights to promote good governance, political 
accountability, and compliance with the rule of law”); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional 
Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958 (2007) (discussing non-delegation norms 
promoted by administrative law doctrine announced in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 
318 U.S. 80 (1943)); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316–
17 (2000) (identifying canons of statutory construction that substitute for under-
enforcement of non-delegation doctrine). 
 16. Scholars in other regulatory fields traditionally viewed as “exceptional”—
including tax law, patent law, foreign affairs, and national security—have observed a 
similar integration of generally applicable administrative law principles. See Jonathan 
Hafetz, A Problem of Standards?: Another Perspective on Secret Law, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2141, 2144–45 (2016); Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax 
Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 222–23 (2014); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid 
Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1903 
(2015) (describing normalization of foreign affairs law); Christopher J. Walker, Chevron 
Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 149, 149–50 (2016) (arguing 
that courts integrate ordinary principles of administrative law into patent law). 
 17. While concepts of citizenship are closely tied to those related to immigration, 
courts have not extended plenary power principles in cases involving the former. See 
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923–24 (2017) (applying ordinary methods of 
statutory interpretation to conclude that naturalization may be revoked on the basis of 
false statements made during the course of naturalization proceedings only if such 
statements bear a causal relationship to the naturalization decision); Sessions v. Morales-
Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017) (applying ordinary equal protection standards to 
reject statute employing sex-based classification in conferral of citizenship to child born 
out of wedlock to U.S. citizen parent); Nyugen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 71 (2001) (purporting 
to apply ordinary equal protection standards to sustain statute employing sex-based 
classification in conferral of citizenship to child born out of wedlock); United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to confer 
birthright citizenship on children of Chinese immigrants). 
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by delegation concerns rather than individual-rights concerns is less 
likely to protect noncitizens from actions by Congress and perhaps 
also the President. Second, where the relevant actor is an agency 
official, judicial scrutiny rooted in structural concerns may be as 
skeptical of administrative decisions benefiting noncitizens as those 
harming them. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the 
prevailing scholarly account of the doctrinal retreat from plenary 
power principles—which emphasizes the emergence of universal 
equality and due process norms—and identifies the theoretical and 
practical shortcoming of this account. Part II introduces a new 
perspective from which to examine shifts in immigration 
jurisprudence, contending that many of the doctrinal developments in 
immigration law can be traced to the same delegation concerns 
animating administrative law more generally. It then shows how this 
understanding helps explain why courts continue to apply plenary 
power principles in some immigration cases but not in others. Part III 
explores the normative implications of a retreat from plenary power 
principles rooted in delegation concerns rather than individual rights. 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PLENARY POWER 
This Part briefly describes the rise and fall of the plenary power 
doctrine before setting forth the prevailing scholarly explanations for 
these developments, which emphasize the role of emerging equality 
and due process norms. It then identifies the theoretical and practical 
limitations of this narrative, which fails to provide a satisfactory 
account for the doctrine’s continued, albeit circumscribed, 
persistence. 
A. The Shift in Immigration Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court’s contemporary immigration jurisprudence 
bears little resemblance to its historical precedent. During what 
scholars refer to as the “classical” era of immigration law, roughly 
dating from the late nineteenth century through the Cold War,18 the 
Supreme Court routinely sustained government decisions that would 
plainly violate constitutional rights had they occurred outside of the 
immigration context, reasoning that the political branches possess 
“plenary power” to exclude, deport, and detain noncitizens without 
judicial restraint. Today, by contrast, the Court routinely exercises 
 
 18. See Motomura, supra note 6, at 550–54 (defining the “classical” period of 
immigration law); Schuck, supra note 6, at 3 (same). 
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close scrutiny over immigration decisions, typically without even 
mentioning plenary power principles. 
1. The Classical Era 
The Court first announced what came to be known as the 
plenary power doctrine in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,19 a case 
challenging the exclusion of Chinese nationals from the United 
States.20 In 1882, Congress enacted the first of a series of Chinese 
Exclusion Acts, which prohibited the entry of noncitizens of Chinese 
ancestry, but allowed such individuals to depart and re-enter if they 
had already established residence in the United States and obtained a 
government certificate of reentry prior to their departure.21 Chae was 
a longtime legal resident of the United States who had left the 
country for a temporary trip to China in 1887 after securing the 
requisite reentry certificate.22 While he was abroad, however, 
Congress enacted a new statute barring the entry of all Chinese 
noncitizens, including returning legal residents who had a valid 
certificate for reentry.23 When Chae was denied reentry, he 
challenged his race-based exclusion and further claimed that the 
refusal to honor his certificate of reentry violated his due process 
rights.24 Rejecting these claims, a unanimous Supreme Court 
concluded: 
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its 
legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a 
different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to 
be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to 
be stayed .	.	.	. [I]ts determination is conclusive upon the 
judiciary.25 
 
 19. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 20. Id. at 589. 
 21. The Chinese Exclusion Acts barred all noncitizens of Chinese ancestry, regardless 
of the individual’s actual nationality. See Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue 
Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7, 8 (David A. Martin & 
Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). Moreover, individuals of Chinese ancestry at the time were 
precluded from citizenship by naturalization. Id. 
 22. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 584; see also Chin, supra note 21, at 7–13 (describing factual background in 
Chae Chan Ping). 
 25. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added). The justifications for this 
radical departure from ordinary standards of judicial review were somewhat oblique. The 
constitutional text does not explicitly vest either Congress or the President with the power 
to regulate immigration, much less the unreviewable power to do so. While it delegates to 
the political branches somewhat related powers, such as the power to regulate 
96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017) 
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Chae Chan Ping now stands for the proposition that decisions to 
exclude noncitizens at the border are not subject to judicial review 
and are instead vested exclusively in the political branches.26 
The Court affirmed these plenary power principles four years 
later in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,27 challenging another iteration 
of the Chinese Exclusion Act, this one mandating the arrest and 
deportation of all Chinese immigrants within the country who failed 
to produce at least one “credible white witness” to testify to their 
lawful presence.28 Fong Yue Ting was ordered deported pursuant to 
this provision, even though the testimony of his non-white witnesses 
was sufficient to persuade the reviewing judge that Fong was, in fact, 
present in the United States lawfully.29 These restrictions—the racial 
qualifications for testimonial witnesses and imposition of the burden 
on the accused to effectively prove her innocence in order to avoid 
detention and exile—clearly would not survive constitutional scrutiny 
had they been imposed on citizens. Yet the Court relied on its 
reasoning in Chae Chan Ping to sustain these restrictions in Fong’s 
case, finding that the political branches’ power to detain and remove 
noncitizens within the nation’s borders is as plenary and unreviewable 
as the power to exclude noncitizens from its territorial soil: “The right 
of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been 
naturalized .	.	.	, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and 
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the 
country.”30 In doing so, the Court denied noncitizens any 
constitutionally cognizable interest not only in returning to, but also 
in remaining in, the United States. 
Importantly, even before either Chae Chan Ping or Fong Yue 
Ting was decided, the Court made clear in Yick Wo v. Hopkins31 that 
the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection applied to aliens and 
citizens alike.32 Invalidating a San Francisco ordinance that had been 
 
naturalization and foreign commerce and to act in foreign affairs, the Constitution makes 
no provision for the immigration and deportation of noncitizens. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, 
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its 
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 857 (1987) (criticizing the judicial conclusion that the 
federal government’s power to regulate immigration, although unenumerated in the 
Constitution, is inherent in sovereignty). 
 26. Henkin, supra note 25, at 854. 
 27. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).  
 28. Id. at 727.  
 29. Id. at 704.  
 30. Id. at 707.  
 31. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 32. Id. at 368. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017) 
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used to discriminatorily deny licenses to Chinese laundry operators, 
Yick Wo unequivocally held: 
The rights of the petitioners .	.	. are not less because they are 
aliens .	.	.	. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is 
not confined to the protection of citizens.	.	.	. [Its] provisions are 
universal in their application, to all persons within the 
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, 
of color, or of nationality.33 
The Supreme Court, however, distinguished cases involving the entry 
and removal of noncitizens from ordinary domestic regulation such as 
that at issue in Yick Wo.34 While the latter remained subject to 
ordinary standards of review, the Court made clear in Fong Yue Ting 
that the former was categorically immunized from judicial scrutiny: 
Chinese laborers .	.	. like all other aliens residing in the United 
States for a shorter or longer time, are entitled, so long as they 
are permitted by the government of the United States to remain 
in the country, to the safeguards of the constitution .	.	.	. But 
they continue to be aliens .	.	. and therefore remain subject to 
the power of congress to expel them, or to order them to be 
removed and deported from the country, whenever, in its 
judgment, their removal is necessary or expedient for the public 
interest.35 
After Fong Yue Ting, noncitizens within the United States would 
be entitled to the full protection of the Constitution on domestic 
regulatory matters but denied any legal protection with respect to 
their removal from the United States under the plenary power 
doctrine.36 
 
 33. Id. at 368–69. 
 34. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 724–25. 
 35. Id. at 724; see also id. at 731 (“The question whether, and upon what conditions, 
these aliens shall be permitted to remain within the United States being one to be 
determined by the political departments of the government, the judicial department 
cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy, or the justice of the 
measures enacted by congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the 
constitution over this subject.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382–83 (1971) (holding that state 
denial of welfare benefits to noncitizens would violate equal protection); Takahashi v. Fish 
& Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) (rejecting denial of fishing licenses on basis of 
alienage on Equal Protection grounds); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) 
(invalidating restrictions on alien employment as violation of equal protection); see also T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 
862, 869–70 (1989) (discussing doctrinal distinction between alienage laws and 
immigration laws). For a discussion of the contested nature of the boundary between 
immigration law on the one hand and alienage law on the other, see Linda Bosniak, 
96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017) 
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During the Cold War, the Court extended plenary power 
principles further. In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,37 the 
Court held that noncitizens have no constitutional right to challenge, 
or even learn the reasons for, their exclusion, stating “[w]hatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an 
alien denied entry is concerned.38 In doing so, it held that noncitizens 
not only have no substantive right to enter the United States, but also 
lack any procedural rights to challenge a denial of entry.39 
Then, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,40 it went so 
far as to deny review over an exclusion decision that resulted in the 
prolonged and potentially permanent detention of the noncitizen.41 In 
that case, the government, on the basis of secret evidence and without 
hearing, denied reentry to Mezei, a longtime legal permanent resident 
who sought to return to his U.S. citizen family after a trip overseas.42 
Because no other country was willing to repatriate him, Mezei was 
placed in detention, where he remained for years, with little prospect 
for release.43 Rejecting his constitutional claims, the Court reasoned 
that Mezei’s detention was a mere byproduct of the exclusion 
decision and thus immunized from judicial intervention: “Whatever 
our individual estimate of [the government’s] policy and the fears on 
which it rests, respondent’s right to enter the United States depends 
on the congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judgment 
for the legislative mandate.”44 By the 1950s, then, the plenary power 
principles extended so far as to sustain even the prolonged and 
potentially permanent detention of noncitizens without hearing.45 
2. The Contemporary Era 
Contemporary immigration jurisprudence today bears little 
resemblance to the early plenary power cases. Today, federal courts 
routinely exercise close scrutiny over immigration decisions, often 
 
Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 
1056 (1994) (conceptualizing immigration law as allocation of rights and benefits to 
noncitizens). 
 37. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 38. Id. at 544. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 41. Id. at 216. 
 42. Id. at 207–09. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 216. 
 45. For a contemporaneous criticism of the Knauff and Mezei decisions, see Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in 
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1391–95 (1953). 
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without mentioning plenary power at all. Over the past quarter 
century in particular, the Supreme Court in case after case has 
applied generally applicable standards of judicial review to vacate 
decisions to exclude, detain, and deport noncitizens. In one of the 
clearest departures from prior doctrine, the Court in Zadvydas v. 
Davis46 discarded plenary power principles to curtail the 
government’s power to detain noncitizens.47 Zadvydas was a longtime 
legal permanent resident who had been ordered deported on the basis 
of a criminal offense.48 He was placed in detention pending his 
removal, but, like the noncitizen in Mezei, faced the prospect of 
prolonged detention because no other country was willing to 
repatriate him.49 Yet the Supreme Court held in Zadvydas that the 
indefinite detention of noncitizens posed a sufficiently grave threat to 
constitutional rights to necessitate the imposition of a judicial time 
limit on the length of statutorily authorized detention.50 
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has exercised review over 
decisions to exclude, detain, and deport noncitizens with striking 
regularity. It has granted certiorari in at least one immigration case 
every term since 2009 and vacated a government immigration 
decision roughly every other year.51 And in the vast majority of these 
 
 46. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 47. See id. at 702. 
 48. Id. at 684. 
 49. The Court purported to distinguish the case from Mezei on the ground that 
Zadvydas was detained after he was ordered deported, while Mezei was detained after 
being denied reentry. Id. at 693–94. The distinction, however, is not entirely persuasive. 
After all, Zadvydas had already been ordered deported and thus, like Mezei, possessed no 
legal right to be in the country. See id. at 684. If anything, Mezei, who had been detained 
for nearly two years and was not provided notice of the charges against him, Shaughnessy 
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208–09 (1953), had a stronger claim of 
procedural violations than Zadvydas, who had been detained for a shorter period and only 
after a full hearing to adjudicate his removability, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85; see 
also N. Alejandra Arroyave, Comment, Preserving the Essence of Zadvydas v. Davis in the 
Midst of a National Tragedy, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 235, 251 (2002) (discussing Justice 
Scalia’s criticism of majority’s attempt to distinguish Mezei). 
 50. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 
 51. See, e.g., Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (2017) (reversing 
order to deport noncitizen on basis of criminal record); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 
1991 (2015) (same); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693–94 (2013) (same); 
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 64 (2011) (same); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514 
(2009) (vacating exclusion of alien seeking asylum); see also Johnson supra note 5, at 117–
18 (summarizing immigration cases from 2009–2013 terms); Kevin R. Johnson, Big 
Immigration Cases in the 2016 Term, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June 29, 2016), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2016/06/big-immigration-cases-in-the-2016-
term.html [http://perma.cc/SSK2-KZ2D] (summarizing immigration cases in the 2016 
term); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court in the 2015 Term, 
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Oct. 9, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration
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cases, the Court has applied ordinary standards of judicial review 
rather than granting plenary deference to the government.52 
B. Prevailing Theoretical Explanation 
The doctrinal retreat from plenary power principles has not 
escaped scholarly notice.53 The prevailing theoretical explanation for 
this doctrinal shift has characterized it as a belated integration of 
public law norms, asserting the universal application of a robust set of 
Equal Protection and Due Process rights into the immigration 
context. While this explanation undoubtedly possesses normative 
appeal, the Court’s decisions do not consistently conform to it, 
significantly compromising its predictive value. 
Scholars have been discussing the “demise” of plenary power for 
decades. With few exceptions, they have attributed it to broader 
public law developments expanding the scope of constitutionally 
protected individual rights.54 Peter Schuck was among the first to 
observe a “fundamental transformation” of immigration law.55 
Writing in 1984, he characterized this shift as signaling judicial 
acceptance of “communitarian” public law norms rooted in “universal 
rights based upon individuals’ essential and equal humanity.”56 
Hiroshi Motomura similarly conceptualized the “gradual demise” of 
the plenary power doctrine as a response to the “gravitational pull” of 
norms “develop[ed] elsewhere in the constitutional law of individual 
rights and liberties,” creating new “phantom norms” in the realm in 
immigration law.57 These views have developed into a near consensus 
 
/2015/10/immigration-in-the-supreme-court-in-the-2015-term.html [http://perma.cc/8LCR-
ER4B] (summarizing immigration cases in the 2015 term); Kevin R. Johnson, Supreme 
Court Immigration Rulings in the 2014 Term, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June 15, 2015), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/06/suprme-court-immigration-rulings-
in-the-2014-term.html [http://perma.cc/CA8H-W4HN] (summarizing immigration cases in 
the 2014 term). 
 52. See, e.g., Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1567; Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1991; 
Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1693–94; Judulang, 565 U.S. at 64; Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514. 
 53. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 6, at 549 (describing retreat of plenary power 
doctrine); Schuck, supra note 6, at 58 (same); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary 
Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002) (same). 
 54. For exceptions, see David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine 
Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 31 (2015) (arguing that plenary power doctrine should be 
understood to resolve allocation of immigration authority between federal government 
and States, rather than claim that sovereignty trumps individual rights), Spiro, supra note 
54, at 340–41 (attributing retreat of plenary power doctrine to changed global order in 
which United States is no longer hegemonic). 
 55. Schuck, supra note 6, at 4. 
 56. Id. at 3–4. 
 57. Motomura, supra note 6, at 549, 566, 577. 
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tracing the evolution of immigration law to the expansion of equal 
protection and due process rights recognized in cases like Brown v. 
Board of Education and Goldberg v. Kelly.58 
This explanation no doubt presents normative appeal. The 
plenary power doctrine has always been difficult to reconcile with the 
principle announced in Yick Wo, extending constitutional protections 
to citizens and aliens alike.59 As the Court has stated, the denial of 
constitutional protections to a category of individuals creates “an 
underclass present[ing] most difficult problems for a Nation that 
prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under the law.”60 If 
Equal Protection and Due Process rights are fundamental and 
universal, it is difficult to see why they should not apply in the 
immigration context. 
As a descriptive matter, however, the individual-rights account 
provides at best an incomplete explanation for the shifts in 
immigration jurisprudence.61 It is true that modern courts frequently 
reverse immigration decisions, often failing to even mention the 
plenary power doctrine.62 Yet courts continue to invoke plenary 
power principles to deny noncitizens’ claims from time to time. As 
late as 1977, the Supreme Court in Fiallo v. Bell63 refused to apply 
ordinary standards of equal protection scrutiny over the government’s 
“double-barreled” discrimination granting preferential immigration 
status on the basis of sex and illegitimacy, concluding that “the power 
to expel or exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute 
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune 
from judicial control.”64 And as recently as 2015, Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Kerry v. Din65 invoked the plenary power doctrine to 
reject a due process challenge to the denial of an immigration visa.66 
Scholars have proposed more limited versions of the individual-
rights account to explain why courts are willing to protect noncitizens’ 
rights in some contexts but not others. Some offer a substantive-
 
 58. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368–69 (1886). 
 60. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982). 
 61. Proponents of the individual-rights theory acknowledge this limitation. See 
Motomura, supra note 6, at 549 (identifying “conflicts and contradictions among the 
cases” that “have frustrated the efforts of courts and commentators to be more precise” 
about the plenary power doctrine’s ongoing relevance); Schuck, supra note 6, at 75 (“[T]he 
transformation of immigration law has significantly increased its indeterminacy .	.	.	.”). 
 62. See supra Section I.A.2. 
 63. 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 64. Id. at 792, 794. 
 65. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). 
 66. Id. at 2139–40 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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procedural distinction in the courts’ willingness to recognize 
individual rights in the immigration context, while others propose an 
insider-outsider distinction to explain the courts’ decisions. Neither of 
these distinctions, however, provides an entirely satisfactory 
explanation for the courts’ modern immigration jurisprudence. 
1. Substantive Versus Procedural Rights 
One version of the individual-rights thesis suggests that the 
retreat from plenary power principles has been limited to a judicial 
willingness to recognize noncitizens’ procedural, but not substantive, 
rights. Under this view, courts have preserved plenary power 
principles to insulate the government’s substantive decisions as to 
which aliens to exclude, detain, or deport; but they have retreated 
from these principles to impose procedural restrictions on how such 
decisions are made.67 
This explanation, however, does not map neatly onto the case 
law. The Court continues to apply plenary power principles even in 
cases raising only procedural rather than substantive claims. In Sale v. 
Haitian Centers Council,68 involving the repatriation of migrant 
Haitians intercepted on the high seas, the plaintiffs asserted no 
substantive right to be admitted into the United States or resist 
repatriation to Haiti; they claimed a right only to some sort of 
procedure to determine whether they fell within the congressionally 
defined category of individuals who could be admitted or at least not 
repatriated.69 Likewise, in Demore v. Kim,70 involving a challenge to 
the mandatory detention of aliens pending removal proceedings, the 
plaintiff did not claim that he was substantively entitled to release; he 
sought only a procedural right to a bond hearing to determine 
whether release was warranted.71 Yet in both cases, the Court did not 
 
 67. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: 
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 
1631–32 (1992) (discussing recognition of “procedural due process” rights in immigration 
law, which “tries to fill the vacuum in substantive constitutional rights that the plenary 
power doctrine has created”); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 
1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 969–72 (1993) (examining the plenary power doctrine in the face of 
changing international norms and changing conceptions of sovereignty, including 
traditional procedural due process conceptions). See generally Motomura, supra note 6 
(analyzing traditional reliance on procedural due process rights in immigration case law).  
 68. 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
 69. Id. at 166–67. 
 70. 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 71. See id. at 522–23. 
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hesitate to apply the plenary power doctrine to deny these limited 
procedural claims.72 
At the same time, the Court routinely applies ordinary standards 
of judicial review in immigration cases asserting substantive claims, 
thus retreating from plenary power principles. In a string of cases 
beginning with Judulang v. Holder,73 none of which involved 
allegations of procedural unfairness, the Court applied ordinary 
standards of judicial review to reject the government’s substantive 
grounds for deporting the noncitizen.74 These cases suggest that the 
procedural versus substantive nature of a noncitizen’s claim is an 
unreliable predictor for whether a court will apply plenary power 
principles in a given case. 
2. Insiders Versus Outsiders 
Another version of the individual-rights thesis distinguishes 
between “insiders” and “outsiders” to explain the doctrinal retreat 
from plenary power principles. Pursuant to this view, the Court has 
been willing to depart from plenary power principles to recognize the 
individual rights of noncitizens deemed to fall within an “insider” 
category. Plenary power continues to apply with full force, however, 
to deny any individual rights to those deemed “outsiders.”75 
Even within this narrative, the line between insiders and 
outsiders is subject to debate. Some have interpreted the case law to 
extend individual-rights protections to “insiders” as defined by their 
physical presence in the United States, while denying such protections 
to “outsiders” remaining outside our nation’s borders; others suggest 
that the case law defines insider status based on lawful presence and 
that plenary power continues to deny any individual rights not only to 
aliens outside of our borders but also to undocumented noncitizens 
within.76 
 
 72. See id. at 513; Sale, 509 U.S. at 187. 
 73. 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
 74. See id. at 52–53 (employing ordinary modes of statutory construction to reject 
removal of alien on basis of criminal conviction); see also Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 
137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (2017) (same); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (2015) (same); 
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693–94 (2013) (same). 
 75. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF 
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 51–53 (2006); Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the 
People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 367, 378–97 (2013) (discussing the varying approaches taken to cases involving 
insiders vs. “putative outsiders”); Daniel I. Morales, Immigration Reform and the 
Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 49, 50–52 (2013) (examining the 
inside/outside distinction). 
 76. See BOSNIAK, supra note 75, at 125–26. 
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Again, however, modern cases do not adhere to such distinctions. 
In Demore v. Kim, the mandatory detention case described above, the 
claimant would have qualified as an “insider” under any definition of 
the term, as he was a legal permanent resident who had not yet been 
adjudicated deportable.77 Such physical and even lawful presence in 
the United States imposed no obstacle to the applicability of plenary 
power principles to deny him the individual rights claimed.78 
*     *     * 
Contemporary immigration law does not consistently conform to 
an individual-rights explanation for the decline of plenary power. 
While the Court discards plenary power principles in favor of 
noncitizens’ interests in some cases, it continues to apply the doctrine 
in others. Neither a distinction between substantive and procedural 
rights nor one based on an alien’s insider versus outsider status 
provides a satisfactory explanation for why courts continue to defer to 
the political branches’ immigration decisions in some cases, while 
exercising robust judicial review in others. 
II. IMMIGRATION LAW THROUGH A NON-DELEGATION LENS 
This Part examines immigration jurisprudence from a slightly 
different perspective, one focused less on individual rights than on 
constitutional structure. It contextualizes changes in immigration law 
within a broader trend common across the modern administrative 
state, in which courts have grown increasingly skeptical toward the 
scope of discretionary authority exercised by unelected agency 
officials. The first Section examines the classical era of immigration 
law from this perspective, showing that courts during this period 
equated the scope of agencies’ immigration power with that of 
Congress. The second Section analyzes the subsequent expansion of 
administrative discretion and the threat these developments posed to 
constitutional non-delegation norms. The third Section recounts how 
immigration law responded to these developments by subjecting 
immigration officials to a series of administrative law doctrines 
 
 77. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 513. 
 78. At the same time, the Supreme Court has retreated from plenary power principles 
to confer individual legal rights to noncitizens who are “outsiders,” at least as defined by 
lawful rather than physical presence. For example, the claimant in Negusie v. Holder, 555 
U.S. 511 (2009), was an “outsider” in that he was seeking formal admission into the United 
States as an asylee, yet the Court applied ordinary standards of judicial review to vacate 
the government’s denial of his application. See id. at 514–16. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 
(1982), the Supreme Court applied even closer scrutiny than required under ordinary 
equal protection analysis to reject the denial of education to the “outsider” group of 
undocumented aliens. See id. at 230. 
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designed to mitigate delegation concerns. The final Section contends 
that this account, in which shifts to immigration jurisprudence are 
largely animated by delegation concerns, helps explain one of the 
central puzzles in contemporary immigration law—why courts 
continue to defer to government immigration decisions in some cases 
but not others. 
A. The Classical Period: Conflating the Immigration Power of 
Congress and Agencies 
During the classical era of immigration law, the Supreme Court 
not only vested Congress with the unreviewable power to render 
immigration decisions, but also extended such power to administrative 
officials as well. When the plenary power doctrine was first 
announced in Chae Chan Ping, it was identified as a power belonging 
to Congress.79 Only three years later, however, the Court in 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States80 suggested that the delegated 
immigration authority of administrative officials was as plenary and 
unreviewable as that of Congress itself.81 In that case, a noncitizen 
brought a due process challenge to her exclusion on the ground that 
she was likely to become a public charge.82 Importantly, Nishimura 
did not challenge the legislative authority to exclude such noncitizens; 
rather, her challenge was limited to the agency’s conclusion that she 
in fact fell within the legislative category to be excluded.83 Rejecting 
that claim, the Supreme Court extended the plenary power doctrine 
to immunize the administrative finding that a particular individual fell 
within the legislative category: “As to [foreigners seeking permission 
to enter the United States], the decisions of executive or 
administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by 
Congress, are due process of law.”84 
 
 79. The Supreme Court stated: 
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative 
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, 
who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their 
exclusion is not to be stayed .	.	.	. [I]ts determination is conclusive upon the 
judiciary. 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (emphasis added).  
 80. 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
 81. Id. at 660. 
 82. See id. at 656. 
 83. Id. at 658. 
 84. Id. at 660. 
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Significantly, immigration officials during this period enjoyed 
only limited statutory authority to engage in discretionary 
decisionmaking.85 Statutes promulgated during that era circumscribed 
the power of agency officials, delegating relatively narrow fact-finding 
authority and specifying a small class of officials authorized to make 
exclusion decisions.86 For example, the first statute imposing 
substantive restrictions on non-citizens’ entry into the United States 
delegated to state customs officials authority to determine whether an 
arriving alien would be excluded because he or she was a “convict, 
lunatic, idiot,” or likely to become a public charge.87 Those statutes 
were consistent with what scholars refer to as the “transmission belt” 
model of administrative governance that prevailed in the earlier days 
of our republic.88 Pursuant to this model, Congress was understood to 
make all substantive rules, delegating to agencies only limited 
authority to decide whether a given rule applied to a particular case.89 
During this era, when agency discretion was already strictly 
circumscribed by statute, the Court was unwilling to impose 
additional constraints on it. 
B. Emerging Delegation Concerns in the Modern Administrative 
State 
As regulatory needs became increasingly complex and technical, 
however, Congress proved incapable of anticipating, much less 
resolving, the multitude of issues confronting modern government. 
Recognizing its limitations, Congress began to delegate increasingly 
open-ended grants of authority to administrative agencies,90 “leaving 
to the relevant agency’s discretion major questions of public policy.”91 
This Section shows the particularly expansive breadth of 
policymaking authority vested in our nation’s immigration agencies 
and then analyzes the constitutional harms threatened by such 
administrative power. 
 
 85. As Gerald Neuman has documented, Congress did not meaningfully restrict 
immigration into the country until the 1880s. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of 
American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834–35 (1993). 
 86. See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, §	2, 22 Stat. 214, 214.  
 87. Id. 
 88. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2253 
(2001). 
 89. As then-Professor Elena Kagan noted, “[t]he first generation of the nation’s 
regulatory statutes .	.	. largely followed this model .	.	.	, containing detailed and limited 
grants of authority to administrative bodies.” Id. at 2255. 
 90. See generally PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED 
STATES (3d ed. 2016) (describing the emergence of the modern regulatory state). 
 91. Kagan, supra note 88, at 2255. 
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1. Discretionary Authority of Immigration Agencies 
Nowhere is the administrative exercise of policymaking authority 
more evident than in the immigration context.92 As the Supreme 
Court recently acknowledged, the “broad discretion exercised by 
immigration officials” constitutes “[a] principal feature” of our 
immigration system.93 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
delegates exceedingly broad authority to develop policies governing 
the admission, detention, and deportation of noncitizens to a vast and 
sprawling immigration bureaucracy—spread across multiple agencies 
including the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) within the Department of Justice, the Bureau of 
Consular Affairs and Office of Visa Affairs within the State 
Department, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(“USCIS”), Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) within the 
Department of Homeland Security.94  
Like all agencies, immigration agencies must interpret the 
governing statute to determine whether a particular provision applies 
to a given case.95 In the immigration context, however, the governing 
statute employs exceptionally broad and ambiguous language.96 For 
 
 92. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 7–13 (2015) (describing the 
extent of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration system); Daniel Kanstroom, 
Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 
71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 751–52 (1997) (“Although administrative discretion permeates many 
aspects of contemporary U.S. law, its impact in immigration law is exceptional.”); Gerald 
L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 625–26 (2006) 
(discussing scope of discretion vested in immigration officials). 
 93. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012); see also e.g., Bill Ong Hing, 
The Failure of Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deportation of Oscar Martinez, 15 
SCHOLAR 437, 499–504 (2013) (criticizing wide discretion afforded to removal officers); 
Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power to 
Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 709–12 (2014) (discussing scope of executive 
branch discretion in immigration law); Neuman, supra note 92, at 611 (criticizing agency 
discretion in determining which noncitizens to deport).  
 94. For a discussion of the respective roles of agency leadership and street-level 
bureaucrats in developing immigration policy, see Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic 
Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1187–88 
(2016). For an overview of the various agencies involved in the U.S. immigration system, 
see id. at 1190–92; Immigration Law (U.S.) Research Guide: Federal Agencies, 
GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY, http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=273371&p=1824781 
[https://perma.cc/U5N4-VEG5] (last updated Apr. 8, 2016) (listing federal agencies with 
immigration authority). 
 95. See Kanstroom, supra note 92, at 759. 
 96. See id. In fact, the Supreme Court is currently considering whether the statutory 
provision authorizing the removal of noncitizens convicted of a “crime of violence” is 
unconstitutionally void for vagueness. See Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 
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example, the INA precludes the entry of most aliens who have 
committed “a crime involving moral turpitude” but provides no 
guidelines for which offenses constitute such crimes.97 Similarly, it 
requires an alien to have “good moral character” to qualify for certain 
visa categories98 and certain types of relief from removal.99 The 
statute lists examples that would preclude a finding of good moral 
character but explicitly provides that the list is non-exhaustive, 
leaving agency officials free to conclude that virtually any noncitizen 
lacks the requisite good moral character.100 
Moreover, statutory requirements for entry into the United 
States frequently hinge on the applicant’s subjective state of mind, 
leaving to agencies the discretion to develop indicia for compliance. 
For example, many temporary visas require the alien to have a 
“residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of 
abandoning,”101 which agency officials determine based on a wide 
range of factors such as land ownership, financial security, and family 
relations. Similarly, to determine whether an asylum applicant has the 
requisite “well-founded fear of persecution” if returned to her 
homeland,102 agencies have developed extensive and complex rules to 
define the types of “persecution” that qualify and determine whether 
the alien’s fear is “well-founded.”103 
The scope of delegated authority vested in immigration agencies 
exceeds that in other regulatory areas in another respect: numerous 
 
2015) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §	1101(a)(43)(F) (2015)), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016), 
reargued sub nom., Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (Oct. 2 2017), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/15-1498.html [https://perma.cc
/C3DD-J8KE]. 
 97. 8 U.S.C. §	1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012); cf. id. §	1101 (providing definitions for 
various terms used in the INA but omitting definition of “crime of moral turpitude”).  
 98. See, e.g., id. §	1154(a)(1)(A)(iv) (allowing certain noncitizen victims of domestic 
violence to self-petition for immigrant visa only where they show they have “good moral 
character”); id. §	1259 (providing for legal permanent resident status to certain noncitizens 
who have resided continuously in the United States since prior to January 1, 1972 upon 
showing of “good moral character”). 
 99. See, e.g., id. §	1229b(b)(1)(B) (requiring “good moral character” as criterion for 
eligibility for discretionary cancellation of removal and adjustment of status to lawful 
permanent resident). 
 100. Id. §	1101(f). 
 101. See id. §	1101(a)(15)(B), (F)(i), (H)(ii), (J), (O)(ii)(IV), (P), (Q)(i). 
 102. Id. §	1101(a)(42) (setting forth definition of “refugee”); id. §	1158 (setting forth 
criteria for asylum). 
 103. See, e.g., M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 234 (B.I.A. 2014) (interpreting meaning 
of “particular social group” for purposes of qualification for asylum); T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
163, 170 (B.I.A. 2007) (interpreting meaning of “persecution” in cases involving economic 
harm); O-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 26–27 (B.I.A. 1998) (interpreting meaning of 
“persecution” in context of actions by non-governmental actors). 
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INA provisions set forth minimum statutory eligibility requirements 
but then delegate to agencies virtually unfettered discretion to make a 
decision once those minimum criteria are satisfied. More specifically, 
the INA explicitly delegates to immigration agencies wide authority 
to exclude aliens who otherwise fall within statutory categories for 
admission, as well as to admit those who otherwise fall within 
statutory categories for exclusion. For example, section	208 of the 
INA provides that a noncitizen qualifies for admission as an asylee 
only if she establishes a “well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of” one of five protected grounds, among other requirements.104 
Satisfaction of these statutory requirements is insufficient for 
admission, however, as the asylum applicant must also obtain a 
favorable exercise of discretion from the immigration agency: a 
decision subject to no statutory guidelines.105 On the flip side, 
section	212(a) sets forth an extensive list of grounds precluding an 
individual’s entry into the United States, such as the commission of 
certain crimes or the absence of requisite travel documents, but 
section	212(d) delegates to agency officials discretion to admit, on a 
temporary non-immigrant basis, virtually any alien who would 
otherwise be statutorily barred from entering the United States.106 
Immigration officials enjoy even wider latitude to allow aliens 
who fall within statutory categories for removal to nonetheless remain 
in the United States. In 1996, Congress vastly expanded the types of 
criminal conduct that would render an alien deportable.107 As a 
consequence, thousands of noncitizens, including many longtime legal 
residents, suddenly became deportable.108 Historically, the only way 
an alien subject to removal could escape deportation was through the 
enactment of a private bill in Congress.109 Since 1940, however, the 
 
 104. 8 U.S.C. §	1101(a)(42)(A); id. §	1158(b)(1)(A). 
 105. Id. §	1158(b)(1)(A). 
 106. See id. §	1182(a) (setting forth extensive grounds for inadmissibility); id. 
§	1182(d)(3)(A) (granting administrative discretion to waive virtually any ground of 
inadmissibility for temporary nonimmigrants).  
 107. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, div. C, §	321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, at 3009-627 to -628 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) (2016)) (expanding definition of “aggravated felony”); id. §	350, 
110 Stat. at 3009-639 to -640 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012)) 
(adding offenses of domestic violence and stalking as grounds for removal); Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §	435, 110 Stat. 1214, 1274–
75 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012)) (expanding grounds for 
removal based on commission of crimes). 
 108. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 
119 YALE L.J. 458, 462 (2009). 
 109. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 933 (1983). 
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mechanisms for granting relief to an alien otherwise subject to 
removal have proliferated. The INA today sets forth a wide variety of 
forms of relief, including “cancellation of removal,”110 waivers of 
specific grounds for removal,111 “stay[s] of removal,”112 and 
“parole.”113 Pursuant to these provisions, once an alien establishes 
minimum threshold eligibility criteria, immigration officers are 
directed to exercise discretion in determining whether such relief 
from removal will be awarded.114 Moreover, such officials enjoy 
virtually limitless power to determine whether the alien will be 
detained or released, with or without a bond, pending removal 
proceedings.115 
Congress has further expanded the power of immigration 
agencies by insulating many of their decisions from any form of 
judicial review.116 The INA explicitly precludes judicial review over a 
wide swath of immigration decisions, including those relating to the 
“expedited removal” of aliens alleged to be inadmissible on grounds 
of fraud or lack of documentation;117 those relating to the removal of 
 
 110. 8 U.S.C. §	1229b. 
 111. See, e.g., id. §	1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (waiver for inadmissibility based on prior unlawful 
presence); id. §	1182(d)(3) (waiver for nonimmigrant inadmissibility); id. §	1182(g) (waiver 
for inadmissibility based on health-related grounds); id. §	1182(h) (waiver of 
inadmissibility based on commission of certain offenses); id. §	1182(i) (waiver of 
inadmissibility for fraud or misrepresentation); id. §	1183 (waiver of inadmissibility based 
on becoming a public charge); id. §	1227(a)(1)(E)(iii) (waiver for deportability based on 
smuggling of family members); id. §	1227(a)(1)(H) (waiver for deportability based on 
fraud or misrepresentation). 
 112. Id. §	1231(c)(2). 
 113. Id. §	1182(d)(5)(A). 
 114. See, e.g., id. (“The Attorney General may .	.	. in his discretion parole into the 
United States .	.	. any alien applying for admission to the United States[.]”). 
 115. Id. §	1226(a). But see id. §§	1226(c), 1226a (imposing mandatory detention for 
certain criminal aliens or suspected terrorists). Although the statute provides no guidelines 
for how detention determinations shall be made, the agencies have concluded that the 
decision should be based on whether the alien poses a flight risk or a danger to the 
community. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (B.I.A. 2006). These officials consider a 
range of factors such as employment history, length of residence in the United States, 
community ties, and criminal record. See Sugay, 17 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638–39 (B.I.A. 1981). 
 116. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§	1158(a)(3), 1158(b)(2)(D), 1252(a)(2). The judge-made 
doctrine of consular nonreviewability has also played a role in insulating immigration 
agency decisions from external constraints. Pursuant to this doctrine, policies relating to 
visa denials by overseas consular officers are not subject to judicial review. See generally 
James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officials, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(1991) (describing limits on supervisory review over consular officers); Tatyana E. 
Delgado, Note, Leaving the Doctrine of Consular Absolutism Behind, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 55 (2009) (criticizing absence of supervisory and judicial checks on visa decisions). 
 117. See 8 U.S.C. §§	1252(a)(2)(A), 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (mandating removal for arriving 
aliens without sufficient documentation “without further hearing or review” and insulating 
such actions from judicial review).  
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aliens based on the commission of past crimes;118 those designated in 
the INA as being within the discretion of the Attorney General or 
Secretary of Homeland Security;119 and those relating to certain forms 
of relief from removal.120 Such insulation from judicial review ensures 
that agency officials have the final word in defining large swaths of 
our nation’s immigration policy. 
Immigration agencies also exercise forms of discretion beyond 
those delegated by statute, and such decisions are not subject to any 
form of judicial review. Congress and the courts have not only 
tolerated these practices, but have endorsed them. First, as in any 
enforcement context, immigration officials exercise prosecutorial 
discretion to determine which removal cases to initiate and pursue.121 
As Professors Cox and Rodriguez have noted, the scope of 
prosecutorial discretion vested in immigration agencies is particularly 
broad, given that Congress has statutorily mandated the full removal 
of one-third of all resident noncitizens while providing the 
immigration agencies with the resources to actually effectuate 
removal in only four percent of these cases.122 Second, immigration 
agencies routinely exercise prosecutorial discretion to grant 
affirmative relief allowing statutorily deportable aliens to remain in 
the United States through the mechanisms of “administrative 
 
 118. Id. §	1252(a)(2)(C). The Supreme Court interpreted this provision narrowly to 
avoid constitutional concerns. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001). 
 119. 8 U.S.C. §	1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
 120. Id. §	1252(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 121. See WADHIA, supra note 92, at 7–13. 
 122. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 108, at 462–63; see also HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 26–27 (2014) (“The practical reality of immigration 
law enforcement is that the federal government tries to remove only a small fraction of the 
unauthorized migrants in the United States.”); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of 
Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to all ICE Employees 1 (Mar. 2, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5ZYS-D7CM] (noting that then-current funding levels would have allowed the federal 
government to remove at most four percent of the estimated 12 million undocumented 
aliens from the United States each year). 
The Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), which did not involve 
immigration, held that administrative exercises of such prosecutorial discretion generally 
are not subject to judicial review. Id. at 837–38 (holding the FDA’s refusal to enforce 
FDCA requirements against states that utilized lethal injection drugs was not judicially 
reviewable). For examples of the vast body of scholarship criticizing this decision, see 
Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet 
Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 856 (1988) (arguing the Heckler 
decision “demonstrate[d] the Court’s rejection of its prior checks and balances 
approach.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 653, 653–54 (1985) (casting doubt on the usefulness of the distinction 
between agency action and inaction and arguing judicial review serves as important 
constraint on regulation).  
96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017) 
2017] PLENARY POWER 101 
closure”123 and “deferred action.”124 Far from limiting administrative 
authority, Congress has appeared to approve of such extra-statutory 
grants of administrative relief.125 In these ways, the power to 
promulgate national immigration policy is increasingly exercised less 
by Congress, and more by the officials populating our nation’s 
administrative agencies. 
2. Threats to Separation-of-Powers Norms 
Administrative exercises of such exceedingly broad discretion, 
not only in the immigration context but also across the regulatory 
state, present a significant departure from the separation of powers 
contemplated by our constitutional framers. Our constitutional text 
and structure have long been understood to vest the federal 
lawmaking authority exclusively in an elected Congress,126 and require 
this body to submit any proposed legislation to an extensive set of 
 
 123. See Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office 
for Immigration Review, to All Immigration Judges, Court Administrators, Attorney 
Advisors, Judicial Law Clerks, and Immigration Court Staff 3 (Mar. 7, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/03/08/13-01.pdf [https://perma.cc
/P8PV-93SM]. Both immigration agencies and federal courts have described 
administrative closure as a mechanism by which an immigration judge removes a case 
from the court’s active docket. Such relief does not grant the noncitizen any form of lawful 
status, and prosecutors remain free to reinstate removal proceedings. See Lopez-Reyes v. 
Gonzales, 496 F.3d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing administrative closure); Avetisyan, 25 
I. & N. Dec. 688, 692, 695 (B.I.A. 2012); EOIR Notice Regarding Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Administrative Closure, DEP’T. OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (July 23, 
2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20160319131659/https://www.justice.gov/eoir/fact-sheet-
prosecutorial-discretion [https://perma.cc/EC9M-K3UG]. 
 124. Deferred action is an administrative device allowing a variety of low-level 
enforcement officers in local offices to grant an alien permission to remain and work in the 
United States, typically for period of one, two, or three years. See 8 C.F.R. 
§	274a.12(c)(14) (2017); see also CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, 
DEFERRED ACTION: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND 
CONSISTENCY IN THE USCIS PROCESS 2 (July 11, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default
/files/publications/cisomb-combined-dar.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK9S-DD9Y]; DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., DELEGATION TO THE BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES 1 (Mar. 1, 2003), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=234775 [https://perma.cc/
NZ4U-WDAT] (describing authority to grant deferred action). 
 125. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No 109-13, §	202(c)(2)(B)(viii), 119 Stat. 302, 
313 (codified at 49 U.S.C.	§	30301 note (Minimum Document Requirements and Issuance 
Standards for Federal Recognition)) (identifying deferred action status as one of the forms 
of proof acceptable for federal approval of states’ issuance of driver’s licenses); Reno v. 
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999). 
 126. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States.”); id. §§	2–3 (specifying electoral process for membership 
in House and Senate, respectively); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That 
Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally 
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained 
by the Constitution.”). 
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procedures prior to enactment.127 The non-delegation principle, that 
Congress may not delegate its lawmaking power to another body, 
“represent[s] the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the 
Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely 
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”128 
These structural features promote a number of related 
constitutional norms. First, by vesting the lawmaking power 
exclusively in a body composed of elected officials, the non-
delegation requirement ensures that those who are responsible for 
enacting federal laws are subject to an electoral check.129 Second, by 
requiring all proposed legislation to obtain the approval of a large and 
varied number of individual actors—a majority of both the House and 
the Senate, as well as the President (subject, of course, to a 
supermajority veto override)—this structure mitigates the risk of 
factionalism, in which the interests of a small group dominate over 
the interests of the greater public, while at the same time protecting 
minority interests from majoritarian oppression.130 Relatedly, these 
procedures enhance the likelihood that all federal enactments have 
been subject to extensive public debate and careful deliberation.131 In 
these ways, the non-delegation principle serves a constellation of 
norms relating to democratic accountability, individual fairness, and 
efficacy. John Manning describes the constitutional goals served by 
the constitutional lawmaking procedure as follows: 
[I]t makes it more difficult for factions .	.	. to capture the 
legislative process for private advantage, it promotes caution 
and restrains momentary passions, it gives special protection to 
the residents of small states through the states’ equal 
representation in the Senate, and it generally creates a bias in 
favor of filtering out bad laws by raising the decision costs of 
passing any law.132 
Notwithstanding these norms, immigration agencies and, indeed, 
agencies across the administrative state, routinely exercise 
exceedingly broad authority to promulgate national policy in 
 
 127. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §	7. 
 128. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
 129. See U.S. CONST. art 1, §§	1–3. 
 130. See Macey, supra note 13, at 819.  
 131. See Clark, supra note 13, at 1340–42.  
 132. Manning, supra note 13, at 239. For additional discussion of the constitutional 
norms served by the non-delegation doctrine, see, for example, Clark, supra note 13, at 
1324; (describing how federal lawmaking procedures protect separation of powers goals); 
Macey, supra note 13, at 819 (describing normative goals of constitutional lawmaking 
requirements). 
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circumvention of the lawmaking procedures mandated by the 
Constitution. 
C. The Judicial Response 
The Supreme Court has been famously unwilling to enforce non-
delegation requirements directly,133 but as scholars of administrative 
law have noted, it has developed a series of doctrines to protect non-
delegation interests indirectly, deploying both constitutional and sub-
constitutional frameworks to cabin the delegated discretion of 
agencies across the administrative state. The application of these 
doctrines to impose judicial constraints on agency discretion in the 
immigration context represents a sharp departure from the plenary 
power principles of the classical era, which insulated the political 
branches’ immigration decisions—whether issued by Congress or 
administrative officials—from judicial review. 
1. Constitutional Mechanism to Limit Agency Power 
The role that delegation concerns have played in the evolution of 
immigration law is particularly apparent in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in INS v. Chadha,134 which invalidated the one-house 
legislative veto.135 That case challenged the constitutionality of the 
1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which delegated to 
administrative officials the power to grant discretionary relief from 
removal to an otherwise deportable alien but allowed that such a 
decision could be overridden by a majority vote in either the House 
or the Senate.136 While the plenary power doctrine would disavow 
judicial interference with any of the political branches’ immigration 
decisions, the Supreme Court in Chadha invalidated the one-house 
legislative veto on the ground that it violated constitutional 
lawmaking requirements: 
 
 133. The Supreme Court tolerates the delegation of much discretionary authority to 
agencies: “If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which 
the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not 
a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). It has found a violation of this exceedingly forgiving standard 
only twice in its history, both during the height of the New Deal. Schechter Poultry Corp. 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (invalidating statute delegating authority to 
create “codes of fair competition”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 
(1935) (invalidating statute delegating authority to regulate transportation of petroleum). 
 134. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 135. See id. at 954. 
 136. Id. at 923; see also Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §	244(c), 
66 Stat. 163, 216 (1952) (repealed 1996). 
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Disagreement with the Attorney General’s decision to deport 
Chadha—no less than Congress’ original choice to delegate to 
the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, 
involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement 
in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to 
the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of 
authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or 
revoked.137 
By enforcing constitutional lawmaking requirements to prevent 
Congress from overriding an administrative agency’s grant of relief, 
the Supreme Court departed from the plenary power principle 
precluding judicial interference in immigration matters. In doing so, 
the majority did not appear particularly concerned about protecting 
individual rights.138 Rather, the opinion has been understood as 
motivated by delegation concerns.139 
To remedy the statute, the Court severed the one-house veto 
provision from the remainder of the statute, thus preserving the 
delegation of agency authority to grant discretionary relief.140 At first 
blush, this remedy would appear to exacerbate delegation concerns 
because it results in more discretionary authority to the agency than 
Congress intended. Further consideration shows, however, that 
Chadha in fact promotes non-delegation norms. By striking down the 
one-house legislative veto, the Court created incentives for future 
legislators to limit the scope of authority they would be willing to 
grant to agencies ex ante because they would no longer be permitted 
to override agency decisions ex post. As Jonathan Macey explains, 
“the legislative veto .	.	. made it easier for Congress to effectuate 
broad, unconstitutional delegations of authority to administrative 
agencies. Declaring the legislative veto unconstitutional makes it 
more costly for Congress to make broad delegations of power .	.	.	.”141 
In this way, Chadha may properly be understood to respond to 
delegation concerns. 
2. Sub-Constitutional Mechanisms to Limit Agency Power 
The role played by delegation concerns in the evolution of 
immigration jurisprudence is further evident in cases subjecting 
 
 137. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954–55. 
 138. Cf. id. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing incursion on judicial power to 
protect individual rights).  
 139. See Macey, supra note 13, at 823. 
 140. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959. 
 141. Macey, supra note 13, at 825. 
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immigration decisions to sub-constitutional administrative law rules 
designed to cabin the growing power of agencies across the regulatory 
state. Administrative law scholars have shown how various 
administrative law doctrines serve non-delegation goals by ensuring 
that agency decisions conform to the norms of political accountability, 
deliberation, and fairness that the constitutional lawmaking 
requirements were designed to protect.142 Far from deferring to 
immigration decisions under the plenary power principles, courts 
routinely apply these ordinary administrative law rules to exercise 
meaningful scrutiny in immigration cases. 
a) The Mid-Twentieth Century 
During the 1950s, even while the Court in Knauff and Mezei 
extended plenary power principles to shield the immigration decisions 
of agency officials, in two other cases it granted review over, and 
indeed went on to reverse such decisions. In Wong Yang Sung v. 
McGrath,143 a noncitizen challenged her removal on the ground that 
the immigration inspector who ordered her deportation not only 
adjudicated removals, but also prosecuted them.144 Sustaining the 
claim, the Supreme Court held that immigration proceedings were 
subject to the recently enacted Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), which prohibited such mixing of prosecutorial and 
adjudicative functions.145 Rejecting the government’s contention that 
immigration proceedings are unique, the Supreme Court held they 
were subject to the same disciplining constraints that the APA 
imposed on all agencies.146 
 
 142. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 13, at 223–24 (discussing influence of non-
delegation norms on doctrines of administrative deference); Metzger, supra note 15, at 484 
(arguing that non-delegation concerns animate much of contemporary administrative law); 
Michaels, supra note 15, at 520; Stack, supra note 15, at 981–82 (discussing non-delegation 
norms promoted by administrative law doctrine announced in Chenery I); Sunstein, supra 
note 15, at 315–16 (identifying canons of statutory construction that substitute for under-
enforcement of non-delegation doctrine). Congressional enactment of the Administrative 
Procedure Act in 1934 was explicitly animated by a desire to develop checks and balances 
on agency decisionmaking by strengthening provisions for judicial review. See Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 848 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he sine qua non of the 
APA was to alter inherited judicial reluctance to constrain the exercise of discretionary 
administrative power—to rationalize and make fairer the exercise of such discretion”). 
 143. 339 U.S. 33 (1950). 
 144. Id. at 35. 
 145. Id. at 35 n.1, 51; see also Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 
Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§	551–59, 702–06 (2016)). 
 146. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 53. Congress immediately enacted legislation 
making clear that deportation proceedings were not subject to APA procedural 
requirements. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306 (1955) (noting congressional 
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The Court went further in United States ex rel. Accardi v. 
Shaughnessy,147 vacating a denial of discretionary relief by generating 
a new judge-made rule, now known as the Accardi principle.148 In that 
case, the BIA denied Accardi’s request for “suspension of 
deportation,” a form of discretionary relief that would have allowed 
him to remain in the United States notwithstanding his prior unlawful 
entry.149 Congress had delegated authority to grant such relief to the 
Attorney General, who in turn enacted regulations vesting this 
authority with the BIA.150 Although the regulations preserved the 
Attorney General’s ultimate discretion to overturn the BIA’s 
decisions, Accardi claimed that the Attorney General violated his 
own regulations when he identified Accardi on a list of “unsavory 
characters” circulated to administrative officials while his removal 
proceedings were pending, precluding the Board’s fair and 
independent consideration of his claim for relief.151 The Supreme 
Court agreed, concluding that by promulgating regulations 
contemplating that the Board would “exercise its own judgment when 
considering appeals,	.	.	. the Attorney General denie[d] himself the 
right to sidestep the Board or dictate its decision in any manner.”152 In 
other words, although the statute delegated to the Attorney General 
discretion to grant or deny relief, the Attorney General was bound by 
his own regulations limiting his ability to do so. In Accardi, now 
famous for the foundational principle—generic to administrative 
law—that an agency is bound by its own discretionary regulations, the 
Court proved willing to impose limits on administrative immigration 
decisions beyond those developed by Congress itself. 
b) Modern Cases 
Today, federal courts routinely employ generally applicable 
administrative law rules to closely scrutinize, and oftentimes reject, 
immigration decisions. These modern cases underscore the extent to 
which concerns about agencies’ political accountability, deliberation, 
rationality, and fairness have supplanted the classical-era notion of 
immigration exceptionalism. The 2009 decision in Negusie v. 
 
passage of appropriations bill six months after Wong Yang Sung to exempt deportation 
proceedings from APA procedural requirements). 
 147. 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
 148. Id. at 268. 
 149. Id. at 261. 
 150. Id. at 262–63. 
 151. Id. at 264. 
 152. Id. at 266–67. 
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Holder,153 vacating an administrative denial of asylum, is instructive.154 
In that case, the BIA denied asylum to a noncitizen pursuant to a 
statutory provision disqualifying individuals who “participated in the 
persecution” of others.155 The applicant argued that his participation 
in such persecution was coerced, but the BIA denied relief, relying on 
judicial precedent interpreting a different statutory provision to 
conclude that the bar on past persecutors applied even in cases of 
coercion.156 
On review, the Supreme Court held that the BIA had relied on 
the earlier judicial precedent in error.157 But rather than affirming on 
other grounds, such as the fact that the agency retained unfettered 
discretion to deny asylum even to aliens who satisfy the statutory 
criteria, the Court applied the rule developed in Securities Exchange 
Commission v. Chenery (Chenery I)158 to vacate and remand.159 
Chenery I established the fundamental administrative law 
principle that a court must evaluate an agency’s decision based on the 
rationales it provided at the time of the decision; it may not sustain a 
decision that relied on faulty grounds, even if the decision might fully 
be justified on other grounds.160 The requirement that an agency 
supply a contemporaneous reasoned explanation for its decision 
exerts a powerful disciplinary force on the administrative 
decisionmaking process.161 As Kevin Stack has pointed out, Chenery 
I’s prohibition against post-hoc justifications promotes norms of 
deliberation by requiring agencies to engage in reasoned 
 
 153. 555 U.S. 511 (2009). 
 154. See id. at 513–14. 
 155. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §	1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
 156. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
 159. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522–23. 
 160. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 87. Chenery I involved the SEC’s exercise of its delegated 
authority to reject corporate restructurings that were not “fair and equitable” or were 
“detrimental to the public interest.” Id. at 90. The SEC required, as a condition of its 
approval of one public utility’s restructuring proposal, that managing shareholders of the 
company surrender shares they had purchased during the reorganization. Id. at 81. 
Initially, the SEC justified its decision on the ground that judicial precedent precluded 
such purchases. Id. at 87. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the 
SEC conceded that its decision was not mandated by judicial precedent, but nonetheless 
decided, based on its independent assessment, that such purchases in the course of a 
restructuring were unfair. Id. at 85. The Supreme Court vacated the decision. Id. at 90. In 
doing so, it expressly held that the SEC was entitled to find that the purchases were unfair 
and thereby reject the restructuring. Id. at 91. The problem, however, was that the SEC 
had not reached such a conclusion at the time it rendered its decision. Id. at 94–95. 
 161. See Stack, supra note 15, at 996–98. 
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decisionmaking before they promulgate a new policy.162 Moreover, it 
promotes norms of accountability by ensuring that the agency’s actual 
rationales for a given policy are “exposed to the public light” and that 
responsibility for the policy is laid at the feet of the officials who 
actually made the decision.163 By imposing requirements for 
deliberation and accountability on immigration decisions, the Court’s 
application of Chenery I to vacate an asylum decision can be 
understood as an attempt to mitigate the delegation concerns raised 
by administrative policymaking. 
The Supreme Court has been particularly active in employing 
administrative law rules to exercise review over, and ultimately 
circumscribe, agency discretion to deport legal permanent residents 
with criminal convictions,164 an area in which administrative officials 
exercise particularly expansive discretion.165 In Judulang v. Holder, 
the Court applied the doctrine of “hard look” review announced in 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co.166 to closely scrutinize, and ultimately vacate, the 
deportation order.167 In State Farm, the Court held that a reviewing 
court must set aside an agency action as “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” under 
the APA168 any time the agency 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before [it], or is so implausible that it 
 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 993–96. 
 164. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (2015) (rejecting deportation of alien 
who had hidden pills in a sock); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1682 (2013) 
(reversing BIA conclusion that conviction for “social sharing of a small amount of 
marijuana” disqualifies deportable alien from discretionary relief); Judulang v. Holder, 
565 U.S. 42, 45 (2011); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010) (vacating 
BIA decision that second conviction of simple drug possession disqualifies deportable 
alien from discretionary relief); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50 (2006) (vacating BIA 
decision that conviction for aiding and abetting possession of cocaine disqualifies 
deportable alien from discretionary relief). 
 165. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 166. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 167. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52–53; see also Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: How 
Judulang Limits Executive Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens Channels for 
Future Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 57 (2012) (characterizing Judulang as an 
unremarkable application of ordinary administrative law rules). 
 168. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 29 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §	706(2)(A) (2012)). 
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could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of 
agency expertise.169 
In doing so, the Court imposed a standard of review far less 
deferential to an agency’s substantive policy choice than the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard provided by statute. Gillian 
Metzger has characterized this reduction in deference as reflective of 
a broader skepticism toward agency decisions, resulting from a 
“dramatic expansion in regulatory authority” coupled with an 
“increasing loss of faith in administrative expertise.”170 
The Court echoed these concerns in Judulang, applying “hard 
look” review to reject the BIA’s denial of relief under now-repealed 
section	212(c), which allowed discretionary grants of relief to aliens 
removable on the basis of certain criminal convictions.171 Although 
section	212(c) by its own terms applies only to “excludable” aliens—
i.e., aliens who entered the United States without inspection—the 
Board’s longstanding practice was to extend section	212(c) relief as 
well to “deportable” aliens including longtime legal residents like as 
Judulang, who became removable after a formal admission.172 
The statutory categories of crime-based excludability are not 
identical to those for crime-based deportability, however. To resolve 
this discrepancy, the BIA adopted a “comparable-grounds” approach, 
allowing a deportable alien to be eligible for section	212(c) relief only 
if he or she was charged with a category of crime corresponding with 
one of the categories of excludable crimes listed in section	212(c).173 
On review, the Court relied on State Farm to reject the use of the 
comparable grounds approach as follows: 
[C]ourts retain a role, and an important one, in ensuring that 
agencies have engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.	.	.	. That 
task involves examining the reasons for agency decisions—or, 
as the case may be, the absence of such reasons.	.	.	. The BIA 
has flunked that test here. By hinging a deportable alien’s 
eligibility for discretionary relief on the chance correspondence 
between statutory categories—a matter irrelevant to the alien’s 
 
 169. Id. at 43. 
 170. Metzger, supra note 15, at 491–92. 
 171. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45–46. 
 172. Id. at 46–47. 
 173. Id. at 49. Judulang’s crime, manslaughter, fell within the deportability category of 
a “crime of violence,” and he was charged with removability on this ground. Id. at 56. Had 
he been seeking initial entry, his crime would have been classified as a “crime involving 
moral turpitude,” an excludability ground eligible for section	212(c) relief. Id. at 54. But 
because a “crime of violence” does not correspond with any of the excludability grounds, 
the BIA concluded he was ineligible for section	212(c) relief. Id. at 56. 
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fitness to reside in this country—the BIA has failed to exercise 
its discretion in a reasoned manner.174 
This demand for a better-reasoned decision from the Board departs 
sharply from the deference to political branches contemplated under 
plenary power principles. 
At the same time, Judulang did not go so far as to deny plenary 
power to Congress. On the contrary, the Court emphasized the 
distinction between the immigration authority of the legislature and 
that of agencies, stating “the case would be different if Congress had 
intended §	212(c) relief to depend on the interaction of exclusion 
grounds and deportation grounds.”175 Emphasizing the heightened 
risk of arbitrariness inherent in administrative, as opposed to 
congressional, decisionmaking, the Court observed: 
[U]nderneath this layer of arbitrariness lies yet another, 
because the outcome of the Board’s comparable-grounds 
analysis itself may rest on the happenstance of an immigration 
official’s charging decision.	.	.	. So at base everything hangs on 
the fortuity of an individual official’s decision. An alien 
appearing before one official may suffer deportation; an 
identically situated alien appearing before another may gain the 
right to stay in this country.176 
The rigorous scrutiny applied in Judulang thus reflects a particular 
concern about the power of agency officials, even while preserving 
deference to Congress with respect to immigration decisionmaking. 
The Supreme Court has also relied on recent changes to the 
Chevron doctrine to deny deference to decisions to deport legal 
residents on the basis of criminal convictions. In Chevron, U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council,177 the Court famously announced 
its two-step framework for reviewing agencies’ interpretations of 
statutes they are charged with administering.178 At the first step, 
courts determine whether Congress has spoken on the issue.179 If the 
statutory language is silent or ambiguous, courts proceed to the 
 
 174. Id. at 53. 
 175. Id. at 56 n.9. 
 176. Id. at 58. 
 177. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 178. See id. at 842–43. 
 179. At this first step, courts are directed to employ the “traditional tools of statutory 
construction” to determine whether “Congress had an intention on the precise question at 
issue.” Id. at 843 n.9. 
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second step of the inquiry, in which they must defer to the agency’s 
interpretation so long as it was reasonable.180 
The Chevron doctrine has evolved considerably since it was first 
announced, however, narrowing the circumstances under which a 
reviewing court will defer to an agency. In Food and Drug 
Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,181 the FDA 
concluded that tobacco products fall within the statutory meaning of 
“drugs” subject to the agency’s regulation.182 On review, the Court 
declined to defer to the agency’s conclusion that the term “drug” 
encompassed tobacco products.183 In doing so, it suggested that, a 
reviewing court may deny Chevron deference to agencies even in 
cases of statutory ambiguity, where the agency decision would result 
in a policy change of significant “economic and political 
magnitude.”184 John Manning has characterized the Brown & 
Williamson decision as “reflect[ing] an evident desire to avoid 
otherwise serious nondelegation concerns,” by ensuring that 
Congress, rather than an agency, accepted responsibility for 
important policy decisions.185 This decision and others denying 
Chevron deference to agencies signal a growing distrust of agency 
policymaking and corresponding willingness to exercise meaningful 
judicial scrutiny to constrain it.186 
 
 180. Id. at 843. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical 
Study of Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998) 
(surveying the Chevron doctrine in practice). 
 181. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 182. Id. at 125. 
 183. Id. at 125–26. 
 184. Id. at 133.  
 185. Manning, supra note 13, at 227–28. 
 186. The Supreme Court retreated further from Chevron’s principle of administrative 
deference in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), holding that only 
formalized agency decisions, such as those made pursuant to formal adjudication or 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, are entitled to Chevron deference; other types of agency 
decisions are subject to the more exacting judicial scrutiny described in Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Mead, 533 U.S. at 221, 226–27 (providing that agency decision 
entitled only to level of “respect according to its persuasiveness” (citing Skidmore, 323 
U.S. 134, 140)). Mead, like Brown & Williamson, promotes non-delegation norms by 
offering Chevron deference as a reward for agencies employing procedural mechanisms 
that ensure some degree of public participation and require the agency to engage in 
extensive deliberation and reason-giving. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 886 (2001) (noting that reserving Chevron deference 
to decisions made pursuant to formal procedures “provides important assurance that 
interpretations entitled to mandatory deference will be open to public criticism before 
they are rendered, and agencies will have incentives to be responsive to these criticism”); 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 539–40 (2003) (noting that Mead promotes 
consistency and uniformity in decisionmaking); see also Michigan v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2699, 
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The Court has employed this gloss on the Chevron doctrine in 
the immigration context to limit agencies’ power to deport legal 
residents on the basis of criminal convictions on several occasions. 
Just this past term, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions187 used this 
approach to deny Chevron deference to the BIA.188 Esquivel-
Quintana had been convicted of statutory rape under California law, 
which defines the crime as consensual intercourse with a minor who is 
more than three years younger than the perpetrator.189 The BIA 
concluded that such as crime constituted “sexual abuse of a minor” 
within the meaning of the INA’s deportability provisions and 
accordingly ordered Esquivel-Quintana deported. Vacating that 
order, the Supreme Court concluded that term “sexual abuse of a 
minor .	.	. unambiguously” excludes convictions for statutory rape 
unless the state law under which the alien is convicted limits the 
definition of that crime to cases involving victims younger than 
sixteen years old.190 This willingness to mandate a judicial 
construction wholly untethered from the statutory text reveals a deep 
discomfort with the breadth of discretion exercised by agency officials 
in determining when legal residents can be deported on the basis of 
criminal convictions. 
Mellouli v. Lynch191 presents another example of the Court’s 
willingness to limit the agency’s discretion to deport residents on the 
basis of criminal convictions. Mellouli pled “guilty to a misdemeanor 
offense under Kansas law,” which prohibits the use of drug 
paraphernalia to store or conceal a controlled substance after he was 
found hiding four Adderall tablets in his sock.192 The BIA ordered 
him removed pursuant to section	237 of the INA, which provides for 
the deportation of any alien “convicted of a violation of .	.	. any law or 
regulation of a State .	.	. relating to a controlled substance (as defined 
in §	802 of Title 21).”193 The referenced provision, 21 U.S.C. §	802, 
defines “controlled substance” as including only those drugs listed in 
one of five federal schedules.194 The BIA in earlier cases had held that 
 
2707–08 (2015) (purporting to apply Chevron deference to agency interpretation of 
statutory authority to impose “appropriate and necessary” regulations but concluding that 
interpretation that precludes consideration of cost in regulation unreasonable). 
 187. 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017). 
 188. Id. at 1572. 
 189. Id. at 1567. 
 190. Id. at 1572. 
 191. 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015). 
 192. Id. at 1983. 
 193. See id. at 1983–84 (first omission in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §	1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
(2012)). 
 194. See 21 U.S.C. §	802(6) (2012). 
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conviction under a state law prohibiting drug possession or 
distribution would trigger deportation under this provision only if the 
state law was limited to the controlled substances included in the 
federal definition.195 It subsequently held, however, that a state law 
conviction for using drug paraphernalia triggered deportation 
regardless of any correspondence between the state law and federal 
definitions of a “controlled substance.”196 The definition of 
“controlled substance” under Kansas law is broader than the federal 
definition of that term.197 But because Mellouli had a conviction for 
drug paraphernalia rather than for possession or distribution, the BIA 
concluded that the overbreadth of Kansas’s definition of “controlled 
substance” posed no obstacle to his deportability.198 
On review, the Supreme Court summarily denied Chevron 
deference to the agency’s construction of the statute.199 As in 
Esquivel-Quintana, the Court placed little reliance on the statutory 
text, rejecting the BIA’s interpretation on the ground that it “ma[d]e 
scant sense,” producing the “anomalous result that minor 
paraphernalia possession offenses are treated more harshly than drug 
possession and distribution offenses.”200 
Mellouli thus conforms to a larger pattern. Far from extending 
“plenary” deference to administrative decisions relating to the 
exclusion, detention, or deportation of aliens, the modern Court has 
repeatedly applied ordinary administrative law rules to deny any 
deference at all. 
*     *     * 
These cases contextualize the retreat from plenary power 
principles within a larger administrative law project to constrain the 
scope of discretion delegated to unelected agency officials. As such, 
they suggest that contemporary standards of judicial review over 
immigration cases may owe as much to concerns about administrative 
power as to any concern for noncitizens’ individual rights. Indeed, 
some of these cases appear to disavow concern for the individual 
alien’s interest altogether by expressly declining to rely on any 
“immigration rule of lenity,” a doctrine directing courts to construe 
statutes in favor of noncitizens faced with removal.201 
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Of course, any given judicial decision may be motivated by a 
multitude of concerns, and a non-delegation theory need not be 
mutually exclusive from an individual-rights theory. Rather, it is 
entirely plausible that concerns relating to both individual rights and 
the expanding scope of agency power have played a role in the retreat 
from plenary power principles in immigration law. After all, it is not 
as though the Supreme Court has been entirely blind to the 
implications of its decisions on non-citizens’ rights.202 In Judulang, for 
example, the Court emphasized the “high stakes for an alien who has 
long resided in this country” in rejecting the agency’s decision.203 In 
Zadvydas, the Court held that the alien’s constitutional due process 
interests required it to read the detention statute narrowly.204 And the 
 
We resolve the doubts in favor of [the] construction [favoring aliens] because 
deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or 
exile. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a 
forfeiture is a penalty. To construe this statutory provision less generously to the 
alien might find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the 
individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom 
beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the 
words used. 
Id. at 10 (citation omitted). For a discussion of the rule of lenity in the immigration 
context, see David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in its Proper 
Place: A Tool of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 491–94 (2007); Brian 
G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
515, 519–28 (2003).  
 202. In the distinct but related area of citizenship, the Court has relied more explicitly 
on an individual-rights theory to reject the government’s decisionmaking. See Sessions v. 
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1697–98 (2017) (applying ordinary equal protection 
analysis to invalidate use of gender classification in determining citizenship based on 
parentage but distinguishing from cases involving use of such classifications in determining 
alien admissions).  
Even in citizenship cases, however, the Court has expressed concern about the scope 
of discretionary authority delegated to agency officials. Such concerns were apparent in 
the majority’s recent opinion in Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017), 
involving an individual stripped of citizenship pursuant to a statute allowing for the 
denaturalization of an individual convicted of procuring naturalization through false 
statements. Id. at 1923–24. Although the agency had interpreted the statute as allowing 
revocation regardless of the false statement’s materiality, the Court unanimously 
concluded that the statute requires a causal connection between the false statement and 
the conferral of citizenship. Id. at 1925. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Sotomayor’s 
opinion for six Justices expressed particular concern about the breadth of discretionary 
authority, noting that the government’s interpretation “would give prosecutors nearly 
limitless leverage—and afford newly naturalized Americans precious little security” and 
concluding that “[t]he defendant in a 1425(a) case should neither benefit nor suffer from a 
wayward official’s deviations from legal requirements.” Id. at 1927–28. 
 203. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 58 (2011). 
 204. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). 
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Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky205 squarely employed an 
individual-rights analysis to hold that noncitizens are constitutionally 
entitled to reasonable legal advice regarding the immigration 
consequences of criminal convictions.206 Nonetheless, understanding 
the Court’s retreat from plenary power as driven at least in part by 
delegation concerns helps explain one of the central puzzles in 
contemporary immigration law—why courts defer to immigration 
decisions in some cases but not others. 
D. Explaining the Persistence of Plenary Power 
A retreat from plenary power principles rooted in delegation 
concerns suggests that courts have not necessarily rejected the 
plenary power doctrine outright but have instead concluded that such 
authority is not freely delegable to unelected agency officials. This 
understanding helps resolve a number of seeming inconsistencies in 
contemporary immigration law. In a variety of contexts, courts have 
retreated from plenary power principles to reject certain types of 
decisions made by an immigration agency. Yet they have extended 
plenary deference to similar types of decisions when made directly by 
Congress or even the President. It is important to note here that the 
Supreme Court has stated that, unlike in ordinary domestic 
regulatory contexts, both the President and Congress share inherent 
authority to regulate immigration, that is, presidential authority over 
immigration is not limited to that delegated by Congress.207 The 
principle that both Congress and the President retain plenary power 
to regulate immigration, but that neither may delegate this unfettered 
discretion to agency officials, helps explain apparent contradictions in 
immigration cases involving immigrant detention, sexual orientation, 
procedural rights, and national origin discrimination. 
 
 205. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 206. See id. at 366. Even Padilla, arguably the strongest support for the conventional 
individual-rights thesis, may be understood in part as a response to a shift in the locus of 
immigration decisionmaking authority away from the judiciary in favor of administrative 
officials. Historically, sentencing judges in criminal courts exercised authority to issue 
“judicial recommendations against deportation,” binding on the nation’s immigration 
agencies. Id. at 361–62. But then Congress circumscribed this provision in 1952 and 
eliminated it altogether in 1990, so that today, immigration officials rather than criminal 
judges exercise exclusive authority to determine the immigration consequences of any 
criminal conviction. Id. at 363–64. The Padilla majority’s emphasis on these statutory 
changes suggests that the decision was at least partly motivated by a desire to reassert 
judicial control over deportation decisions. See id. at 361–64. 
 207. See Kim, supra note 93, at 711. 
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1. Immigrant Detention 
The non-delegation theory clarifies the ongoing vitality of 
plenary power principles in determining the scope of review over 
immigrant detention. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court 
discarded plenary power principles to invalidate the indefinite 
detention of aliens.208 Yet only two years later in Demore v. Kim, the 
Supreme Court applied plenary power to sustain the mandatory 
detention of aliens.209 The key to understanding the invocation of 
plenary power principles in Kim but not in Zadvydas lies in the 
identity of the institutional actor making the detention decision. In 
Zadvydas, the detention decision required the intervening 
discretionary judgment of an unelected agency official, while in Kim, 
the decision was made by Congress directly.210 
In Zadvydas, the Court reviewed a due process challenge 
brought by an alien who had been adjudicated deportable but 
remained in detention because no other country was willing to accept 
him.211 Congress delegated to the agency the authority to detain an 
individual beyond the 90-day period in which removal is typically 
effectuated.212 In light of the “serious constitutional concerns” 
implicated by an alien’s indefinite detention, however, the Court 
imposed a presumptive six-month limitation to such detention, a 
remedy wholly untethered from the statutory text.213 In doing so, the 
Court emphasized, “the Constitution may well preclude granting ‘an 
administrative body the unreviewable authority to make 
determinations implicating fundamental rights.’”214 In this manner, 
the Court underscored the need for constraints on administrative 
exercises of delegated discretion. 
In Demore v. Kim, respondent raised a due process challenge to 
a different detention provision, also enacted in 1996, which mandated 
detention without bail for certain aliens pending their removal 
proceedings.215 Rejecting the challenge, the Court applied the plenary 
power doctrine, affirming that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power 
over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules 
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that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”216 Unlike in 
Zadvydas, the detention decision in Kim originated directly from 
Congress; indeed, Congress added the mandatory detention provision 
to eliminate the discretion of administrative officials to release aliens 
on bail pending their removal proceedings.217 Where the detention 
decision stemmed from Congress rather than agency officials, the 
Court applied the plenary power doctrine to sustain the detention. 
2. Sexual Orientation 
The non-delegation theory of plenary power similarly helps 
explain a pair of earlier cases involving the deportation of noncitizens 
on the basis of sexual orientation. In both Rosenberg v. Fleuti218 and 
Boutilier v. INS,219 a statutory provision barring any alien “afflicted 
with a psychopathic personality” had been applied to exclude gay 
men from the United States.220 The Court rejected the alien’s 
exclusion in Fleuti but four years later sustained it in Boutilier.221 A 
focus on delegation concerns helps resolve this apparent 
inconsistency. 
In Fleuti, where the application of the statutory provision 
depended on the discretionary judgment of an agency official, the 
Court intervened. Fleuti was admitted as a legal permanent resident 
into the United States before the “psychopathic personality” 
provision came into effect.222 The terms of the statute denied “entry” 
to covered individuals but did not affect aliens already within the 
United States.223 Years later Fleuti crossed the Mexican border for a 
brief trip of “about a couple hours.”224 On his return, agency officials 
concluded that he was seeking “entry” into the United States and 
applied the newly enacted bar to exclude him.225 The Supreme Court 
rejected the exclusion, holding that the agency improperly applied the 
statute to Fleuti because a legal resident returning to the United 
States after “an innocent, casual, and brief” trip abroad is not deemed 
to be seeking “entry” within the meaning of the statute.226 
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Four years later in Boutilier, however, where the exclusion 
decision was directed by Congress itself, the Court adhered to plenary 
power principles to sustain it. Unlike Fleuti, Boutilier’s initial entry 
into the United States clearly post-dated the enactment of the new 
entry restriction.227 He argued, however, that the excludability bar 
was void for vagueness as applied to him.228 Rejecting the challenge, 
the Court noted that “[t]he legislative history of the Act indicates 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that Congress intended the phrase 
‘psychopathic personality’ to include homosexuals such as 
petitioner.”229 Squarely confronted with the question of Congress’s 
power to exclude aliens on the basis of sexual orientation, the Court 
proved unwilling to delimit it.230 These comparisons of cases 
demonstrate that while the Court may impose meaningful judicial 
constraints on the immigration decisions of federal agencies, it is far 
less willing to do so with respect to decisions by Congress. 
3. Procedural Rights of Refugees 
Inconsistencies in the procedural rights afforded to refugees can 
also be understood when viewed from a non-delegation perspective. 
In accordance with international treaty obligations,231 Congress 
enacted what is known as the “withholding of removal” provision in 
the Refugee Act of 1980 which provided: “The Attorney General 
shall not deport or return any alien .	.	. to a country if the Attorney 
General determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be 
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”232 
Grants of withholding, unlike grants of asylum, are not discretionary; 
 
 227. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 118–19 (1967). 
 228. Id. at 120 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. at 123–24. 
 231. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees arts. 1, 33, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
 232. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 203(e), §243(h)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 107 
(repealed 1996). A substantially similar provision was enacted at the time of repeal. Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 
305(a)(3) §	241(b)(3)(A), 110 Stat. 3009-546, at 3009-602 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§	1231(b)(3)(A) (2012)) (“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if 
the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that 
country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”). 
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an individual who satisfies the threshold showing is legally entitled to 
withholding.233 
Lower courts have repeatedly rejected attempts by 
administrative agencies to deny procedural protections to noncitizens 
pursuant to this provision. In Maldonado-Perez v. INS,234 the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a noncitizen is legally 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to show that repatriation would 
threaten his or her life or freedom.235 The Second Circuit went further 
in Augustin v. Sava236 to vest aliens with a right to translation services 
during such hearings.237 And in Selgeka v. Carroll,238 the Fourth 
Circuit rejected the agency’s attempt to provide stowaways with only 
an informal interview before an INS officer as opposed to a full 
hearing before an Immigration Judge.239 
Yet, the Supreme Court has denied any such procedural 
protections where repatriation without hearing was ordered by the 
President himself. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, discussed in 
Section I.B.1, was decided in the context of a humanitarian crisis 
beginning in the 1970s, in which political and economic turmoil in 
Haiti caused tens of thousands to flee for the United States, often on 
unseaworthy vessels.240 Although many had valid claims for 
withholding of removal, the sheer volume of migrants exceeded the 
government’s capacity to process their claims.241 In response, 
President Bush issued an Executive Order directing the Coast Guard 
to forcibly repatriate migrants found on the high seas without any 
process for screening aliens for valid claims of persecution.242 
Deferring to the President’s decision to deny procedural protections 
for withholding claims, the Court stated: “We cannot say that the 
interdiction program created by the President .	.	. usurped authority 
that Congress had delegated to, or implicated responsibilities that it 
had imposed on, the Attorney General alone.”243 The President, 
 
 233. Compare 8 U.S.C. §	1231(b)(3)(A) (2012) (withholding provision), with id. 
§	1158(b)(1)(A) (asylum provision). In INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the 
Supreme Court held that withholding of removal requires the noncitizen to establish a 
higher likelihood of persecution than asylum. Id. at 429. 
 234. 865 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 235. Id. at 332. 
 236. 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 237. Id. at 37. 
 238. 184 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 239. Id. at 345. 
 240. Sale v. Hatian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155,160–64 (1993) 
 241. Id. at 163. 
 242. Id. at 164. 
 243. Id. at 172. 
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exercising inherent authority to regulate immigration rather than 
power delegated by Congress, was thus free to deny even the 
truncated hearings that agencies were judicially mandated to 
provide.244 
4. Nationality Classifications 
Distinctions based on nationality present particularly thorny 
questions in immigration law. Such distinctions are presumed to be 
invidious and thus impermissible in almost every other context.245 Yet 
they arguably inhere in the very notion of an immigration system, 
premised as it is on a distinction between United States citizens versus 
noncitizens. Moreover, nationality distinctions among non-U.S. 
citizens are deeply rooted in historical practice, evident not only in 
the Chinese Exclusion Acts, but indeed the preceding laws 
implementing an immigration policy favoring Chinese immigrants, as 
negotiated through a bilateral treaty with the Emperor of China.246 
Even today, nationality classifications are pervasive in our 
immigration system. For example, the visa waiver program allows 
nationals of some countries to visit the United States without first 
obtaining a visa, while requiring nationals of other countries to apply 
for a visa at a U.S. consular office before traveling to the United 
States.247 Uniform per-country ceiling limits on immigrant admissions 
require nationals of Mexico or the Philippines to wait ten to fourteen 
years longer than applicants from other countries for certain 
categories of visas.248 The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on 
 
 244. Sale differed from the other cases involving withholding procedures in another 
important respect: the claimants in Sale never reached the territorial United States. Id. at 
162–63. The extraterritorial nature of the claim as well as the identity of the 
decisionmaker—the President rather than agency officials—virtually ensured the Court’s 
refusal to intervene. See id. at 188.  
 245. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (noting that “the Court’s 
decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on 
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 246. See Additional Articles to the Treaty Between the United States of America and 
the Ta-Tsing Empire (Burlingame Treaty), China-U.S., art. V, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739. 
 247. See 8 U.S.C. §	1187(a), (c) (2012). The program currently exempts nationals of 
thirty-eight countries from visa requirements. Visa Waiver Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/visa-waiver-program.html [https://perma.cc/6SHP-
DT3X]. In addition, nationals of Canada and Mexico may enter the United States without 
a visa. 8 C.F.R. §	212.6(a), (b) (2017). 
 248. Pursuant to the per-country visa ceiling limits imposed by section	202 of the INA, 
an applicant from Mexico can wait fourteen years longer than other applicants for the 
same type of visa; another type of visa requires Filipinos to wait ten years longer than 
other applicants. See, e.g., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA 
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the constitutionality of nationality classifications in immigration law 
since the Chinese Exclusion era. In modern times, the permissibility 
of such distinctions, presumed to be invidious in other contexts, has 
been unclear. Courts appear to be struggling with the circumstances 
under which distinctions on the basis of nationality should be 
tolerated in immigration law. Nonetheless, the non-delegation theory 
underscores one important variable influencing judicial willingness to 
tolerate such classifications: the identity of the government actor. 
Courts have generally been skeptical toward the use of 
nationality classifications where they are a result of an administrative 
exercise of delegated power. The Supreme Court’s decision in Jean v. 
Nelson,249 while declining to issue a direct constitutional ruling, 
suggested a deep reluctance to vest agencies with plenary power to 
discriminate on this basis.250 That case involved the INS’s exercise of 
delegated discretion to grant parole to aliens arriving into the United 
States who would otherwise be subject to detention pending removal 
proceedings.251 Although the agency historically opted in favor of 
granting parole to aliens arriving on our nation’s shores without 
documentation, it changed course in 1981 in response to the influx of 
Haitian and Cuban migrants sailing to South Florida, implementing a 
new policy of detaining rather than releasing such aliens.252 
In Jean, a group of Black Haitian migrants challenged the new 
policy, alleging that it discriminated against them on the basis of race 
and nationality.253 The lower court rejected this claim, reasoning that 
“the grant of discretionary authority to the Attorney General .	.	. 
 
BULLETIN 2 (Nov. 2016) https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin
_November2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8WZ-D5HV] The wait-times for each visa 
category, by nationality, are provided on a monthly basis by the State Department. See 
Visa Bulletin, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-
policy/bulletin.html [https://perma.cc/B7TJ-FN4X]; see also 8 U.S.C. §	1152(a)(2) 
(allowing per-country visa quotas).  
 249. 472 U.S. 846 (1985). 
 250. Id. at 857. 
 251. Id. at 848 (“[INA section	212] authorizes the Attorney General ‘in his discretion’ 
to parole into the United States any such alien applying for admission ‘under such 
conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the 
public interest.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. §	1182(d)(5)(A)(1982)). 
 252. See id. at 848–49. 
 253. The Court appeared to use the terms “nationality” and “national-origin” 
interchangeably. See id. at 856–57. But see id. at 863–64 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting 
distinction between national origin and nationality). See generally Liav Orgad & Theodore 
Ruthizer, Race, Religion and Nationality in Immigration Selection 20 Years After the 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 237, 247 (2010) (using term “nationality to 
include two concepts: the first refers to one’s country of birth or of current citizenship. The 
second refers to one’s national or ethnic origins, regardless of citizenship.”). 
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permit[s] the Executive to discriminate on the basis of national origin 
in making parole decisions.”254 On appeal, however, the Supreme 
Court reversed, concluding that the lower court improperly reached 
the constitutional question.255 Instead, it employed the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance to impose a textually untethered limit to 
discretionary grants of parole, concluding that both the relevant 
statute as well as the Attorney General’s regulations prohibited 
considerations of race or nationality in parole determinations.256 It 
concluded: 
This case does not implicate the authority of Congress, the 
President, or the Attorney General. Rather, it challenges the 
power of low-level politically unresponsive government officials 
to act in a manner which is contrary to federal statutes .	.	. and 
the directions of the President and the Attorney General, both 
of whom provided for a policy of non-discriminatory 
enforcement.257 
This decision is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the Court 
imposed a textually unsupported limit to a broad delegation of 
statutory authority, concluding that Congress had not intended to 
allow lower-level agency officials to exercise such authority in a 
discriminatory manner. Second, the decision was careful to 
distinguish the scope of discretionary authority delegated to these 
lower-level officials from that of Congress and the President, 
declining to issue a ruling that would limit the plenary power vested 
in these constitutional heads of the political branches. In this way, 
Jean v. Nelson appears more concerned with the delegation of power 
to “politically unresponsive” agency officials than with the premise of 
plenary power principles more generally.258 
 
 254. Jean, 472 U.S. at 852. 
 255. Id. at 854–55. 
 256. Id.; see also id. at 862–64 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (parsing statutory text to 
conclude that it does not preclude agency from considering race or national origin in 
parole decisions).  
 257. Id. at 853 (majority opinion). 
 258. Id.; see also Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating INS 
officer’s decision to target aliens with Nigerian surnames); Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 
31, 38–39 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting consular policy of applying closer scrutiny to visa 
applicants from certain nations). But see Maldonado v. Holder, 763 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 
2014) (holding in dicta that ICE officials were permitted to target particular nationalities). 
In Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) the D.C. Circuit concluded that a statutory prohibition against nationality 
discrimination precluded the State Department from singling out Vietnamese applicants in 
this manner. Id. at 473–74. After Congress intervened, however, amending the relevant 
statute to expressly provide that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the 
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Consistent with this approach, lower court decisions continue to 
defer to the plenary power of Congress to employ nationality 
classifications in immigration law. The Fourth Circuit decision in 
Appiah v. INS,259 upholding provisions of the Nicaraguan Adjustment 
and Central American Relief Act granting preferential treatment to 
nationals of Guatemala, El Salvador, and former Soviet bloc nations 
seeking relief from removal, is typical: “Although these provisions 
differentiate among aliens based on national origin, strict scrutiny 
does not apply here because Congress can favor some nationalities 
over others in immigration law.”260 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in 
Rodriguez-Silva v. INS261 observed: 
Due process does not require Congress to grant aliens from all 
nations the same chances for admission to or remaining within 
the United States. Congress may permissibly set immigration 
criteria that are sensitive to an alien’s nationality or place of 
origin. It is not for this Court to question Congress’s decisions 
on such matters.262 
Courts have been unwilling to intervene in such decisions, deferring 
to the plenary power of Congress to regulate immigration. 
Likewise, courts have deferred to nationality classifications 
employed by the President himself.263 In Narenji v. Civiletti,264 the 
 
authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of 
immigrant visa applications or the locations where such applications will be processed,” 
the D.C. Circuit upheld the discriminatory treatment. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese 
Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 104 F.3d 1349, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
1152(a)(1) (2012)).  
 259. 202 F.3d 704 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 260. Id. at 710. Under the challenged provisions, individuals from the identified nations 
would not be subject to the “stop-time” provisions for determining whether they met the 
minimum time requirements for physical presence and residence. Id. at 706. 
 261. 242 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 262. Id. at 248; see also Sad v. INS, 246 F.3d 811, 822 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that 
“Congress may favor some nationalities over others when enacting immigration laws” and 
such decisions are subject to a “standard even more deferential than rational-basis 
review”). 
 263. For assessments of the relationship between the President and administrative 
agencies, see generally Bressman, supra note 186, at 515 (criticizing presidential control 
over agencies for compromising good governance norms); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary 
Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. 
REV. 441 (2010) (challenging notion that president should control agencies on political 
accountability grounds); Kagan, supra note 88 (celebrating presidential control over 
agency decisionmaking); Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
1741 (2009) (arguing that presidential interference in agency decisionmaking subverts 
transparency and accountability); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative 
Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1402–03 (2013) (warning 
of risk that politics will completely eclipse norms of deliberation in the modern 
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit applied the 
plenary power doctrine to reject an equal protection challenge to a 
regulation targeting Iranian nationals for special reporting 
requirements.265 In doing so, the court emphasized that the regulation 
had been promulgated at the direction of the President: “the present 
controversy involving Iranian students in the United States lies in the 
field of our country’s foreign affairs and implicates matters over 
which the President has direct constitutional authority.”266 Given the 
President’s personal imprimatur on the policy,267 the court declined to 
restrain the explicit targeting of Iranian nationals.268 
A series of cases sustaining the post-9/11 “special registration” 
program departs somewhat from the general pattern, exhibiting a 
willingness to extend plenary power principles to cabinet-level 
officials directly below the President. Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, the Attorney General personally announced a program 
requiring categories of aliens from a list of predominantly Muslim 
nations to report to immigration officials for fingerprinting and 
interrogation.269 Although this program, unlike the one at issue in 
Narenji, did not bear the President’s personal imprimatur, every 
circuit court to review the special registration program sustained it.270 
It may be that courts are willing to treat the Attorney General, a 
“principal officer” appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the 
President, as the functional equivalent of the President for purposes 
of assessing the scope of this official’s immigration authority.271 The 
 
administrative state); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
965, 968 (1997) (expressing concern that presidential control over rulemaking erodes 
balance between law and politics); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 
MICH. L. REV. 683 (2016) (describing ways in which administrative law tools can be used 
to temper presidential control). 
 264. 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 265. Id at 748. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65, 728 (Nov. 14, 1979). 
 268. See Narenji, 617 F.2d at 748. 
 269. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Announces 
Implementation of the First Phase of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration 
System (Aug. 12, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2002/August/02_ag
_466.htm [https://perma.cc/C8FY-GCX2].  
 270. See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 432–34 (2d Cir. 2008); Kandamar v. 
Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2006); Zafar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367 
(11th Cir. 2006); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 271. But see Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp.3d 591, 606–07 (S.D. Tex. 2015) 
(applying ordinary administrative law principles to closely scrutinize immigration policy, 
emphasizing that decision was made by the Secretary of Homeland Security rather than 
the President himself), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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Second Circuit’s opinion in Rajah v. Mukasey272 supports this view, 
emphasizing the proximity of the Attorney General to the President 
even while acknowledging that judicial intervention would be 
appropriate had the policy targeting particular nationalities been 
made at a lower level of the executive branch.273 The special 
registration cases thus suggest that the plenary power doctrine may 
extend not only to shield immigration decisions of Congress and the 
President, but also those made by cabinet-level officials directly 
below the President. At the same time, they also confirm a reluctance 
to extend plenary power principles further, to reach lower level 
agency officials. 
*     *     * 
The continued judicial willingness to defer to the immigration 
decisions of Congress and the President even while denying such 
deference to lower-level administrative officials suggests that courts 
have not necessarily rejected plenary power principles outright, but 
concluded that such unreviewable power cannot be delegated to 
agency officials. 
The Supreme Court may provide more clarity on this issue in 
connection with litigation challenges to President Trump’s efforts to 
exclude noncitizens solely on the basis of nationality.274 The Court 
had granted certiorari to review the validity of an earlier Executive 
Order imposing such an exclusion,275 but that Order has since expired 
and been replaced by a new Proclamation, issued in September 
2017.276 As this Article goes to press, challenges to the Proclamation 
are working their way through the lower courts and are likely to 
present the Supreme Court with another opportunity to address the 
scope of judicial review over presidential immigration decisions.277 
 
 272. 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 273. See id. at 434–36 (“If the Program was in fact simply rogue conduct by 
immigration authorities, some remedy .	.	. would be called for.”). 
 274. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No. 
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (revoking and replacing Exec. Order No. 
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017)). 
 275. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (granting 
certiorari and consolidating Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (en 
banc) (4th Cir. 2017) and Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017)), vacated and 
remanded, Trump v. Hawaii, __ S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4782860, (Oct. 24, 2017) (mem.), 
dismissed as moot, __ F.3d __, 2017 WL 5034677 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2017) and Trump v. Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project, __ S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553, (Oct. 10, 2017) (mem.), 
dismissed as moot, No. 17-1351 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2017). 
 276. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,165–68. 
 277. See Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17–00050, 2017 WL 4639560, at *1 (D. Hawaii, Oct. 17, 
2017); Int’l Regugee Assistance Project v. Trump, Civil Action No. 17-0361, 2017 WL 
4674314, at *10 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017). 
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III. A NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF A NON-DELEGATION THEORY 
OF PLENARY POWER 
The preceding Part developed a non-delegation theory for the 
doctrinal retreat from plenary power principles, suggesting that courts 
have not necessarily rejected the notion of plenary power outright, 
but rather concluded that such power is not freely delegable to agency 
officials. This Part presents a normative assessment of this approach. 
It begins by defending judicial scrutiny over administrative 
immigration decisions as consistent with the plenary power doctrine’s 
theoretical underpinnings. It continues, however, by critiquing the 
continued vitality of plenary power under the non-delegation theory. 
A retreat from plenary power principles rooted primarily in 
delegation concerns falls short of the ultimate goal of recognizing full 
constitutional protections to noncitizens because it fails to constrain 
the power of Congress and the President. And even where the 
relevant decisionmaker is an administrative officer, a non-delegation 
theory of plenary power may be as likely to reject agency decisions 
favorable to noncitizens’ interests as those that harm them. 
A. Defending the Denial of Plenary Power to Agency Officials 
The denial of deference to administrative immigration decisions 
is defensible on the plenary power doctrine’s own terms. Courts have 
offered a number of rationales for vesting an unreviewable power to 
regulate immigration with the political branches. The most 
compelling of these are based on notions of democratic self-
determination and the need for a uniform immigration policy, but 
neither justifies extending such power to unelected administrative 
officials. 
The theory of plenary power—that unelected courts must defer 
to the immigration decisions of the political branches—rests primarily 
on a notion of democratic self-determination. In Chae Chan Ping, the 
Court emphasized the “undoubted right” of “[e]very society .	.	. to 
determine who shall compose its members,”278 apparently concluding 
that the polity, as represented by the political branches, must be free 
to define the terms of its membership without judicial interference.279 
Whatever the merits of this claim as applied to decisions of politically 
 
 278. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 607 (1889). 
 279. See id. at 609 (stating that the decisions relating to the exclusion of noncitizens 
“are not questions for judicial determination. If there be any just ground of complaint .	.	.	, 
it must be made to the political department of our government, which is alone competent 
to act upon the subject”). 
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representative bodies, it is unpersuasive as applied to the decisions of 
unelected agency officials. Legislative and even presidential decisions 
reflect the will of the electorate in a way that lower-level agency 
decisions simply do not. 
A second rationale that has been used to defend the plenary 
power doctrine is the need for a uniform policy toward foreign 
nations and their citizens. As the Court in Chae Chan Ping put it, 
“[f]or local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for 
national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we 
are but one people, one nation, one power.”280 Judicial intervention in 
immigration decisions, it has been argued, would compromise 
sensitive foreign relations and our nation’s ability to speak with one 
voice.281 Again, this rationale translates poorly to agency 
decisionmaking. The decisions of Congress and the President, 
constitutionally vested with authority to regulate foreign relations, are 
more likely to cohere as a national uniform policy as compared to the 
decisions of various states or federal courts. The same cannot be said, 
however, of the granular decisions of low-level immigration officials. 
The diffusion of authority across our nation’s vast and sprawling 
immigration bureaucracy precludes any claim that vesting plenary 
power in agencies will improve uniformity. 
There are, of course, valid reasons for courts to defer to agencies 
as a general matter, including expedience, efficiency, and 
administrative expertise.282 But claims that low-level agency officials 
should be entrusted to exercise powers inherent in sovereignty, 
should engage in sensitive foreign relations, or would be likely to 
develop a uniform national policy, are not among them. The 
realization that there is simply no reason to carve out immigration 
officials from the legal rules generally applicable to the larger 
administrative state comes as a welcome development. 
 
 280. Id. at 606. 
 281. See id. (“If the government of [a foreign] country .	.	. is dissatisfied with 
[immigration decisions] it can make complaint to the executive head of our government 
.	.	.	; and there lies its only remedy.). 
 282. For a defense of these values over electoral accountability, see Bressman, supra 
note 186, at 516–18 (arguing that attempts to justify administrative legitimacy have 
focused too much on political accountability at the expense of concerns regarding agency 
arbitrariness); Criddle, supra note 263, at 470–78 (promoting view of administrative 
legitimacy based on norms of deliberation and reasonableness rather than exclusively 
based on electoral accountability); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. 
EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 65–67 (2008) (characterizing 
recent administrative law decisions as “expertise-forcing,” reflecting judicial 
disenchantment with politicization of administrative decisionmaking). 
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B. Shortcomings of the Non-Delegation Theory 
For the many who hoped that the shifts in immigration law 
would ultimately lead to the recognition of full constitutional 
protections for noncitizens, however, the non-delegation theory of 
plenary power does not go nearly far enough. First, it continues to 
deny meaningful judicial review when Congress or the President 
violates noncitizens’ rights. Second, although courts may exercise 
robust review over the decisions of agency officials, such review may 
be as likely to reverse immigration decisions that protect aliens’ 
interests as those that harm them. 
1. Failure to Protect Against Congress and the President 
The non-delegation theory of plenary power continues to shield 
immigration decisions rendered directly by Congress or the President 
from meaningful judicial review. These institutional actors remain 
free to exclude, detain, and deport aliens, regardless of the extent to 
which such decisions violate other constitutional norms. And, while 
the vast majority of immigration decisions are made by agency 
officials and thus remain subject to judicial review, Congress and the 
President have been responsible for some of our nation’s most 
troubling immigration policies. 
President Trump’s actions during his first year in office 
underscore the importance of this distinction. Through a series of 
executive orders, President Trump has promulgated a number of 
policies posing grave threats to noncitizens’ interests. The “travel 
ban,” prohibiting the entry of nationals from particular countries, is 
the most prominent among these.283 Other provisions, which have 
received far less public attention, include the scaling back of 
procedural protections for noncitizens accused of deportability and 
expansion of policies to detain noncitizens without a bond hearing 
pending removal proceedings.284 
It is true that the lower court decisions in the travel ban cases 
suggest a willingness to impose judicial checks on the President’s 
immigration power. In those cases, courts have held that individual-
rights concerns preclude even the President from making immigration 
decisions based on religion or arbitrary nationality classifications.285 
 
 283. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No. 
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (revoking and replacing Exec. Order No. 
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), and prohibiting entry). 
 284. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 285. Lower court decisions reviewing the first version of the travel ban include 
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164–66 (9th Cir. 2017); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 
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Those decisions, however, relied on explicit statements made by 
President Trump himself expressing an intent to exclude all Muslims 
on terrorism grounds.286 It is not at all clear that courts will be willing 
to constrain the President’s immigration power in cases without direct 
evidence of animus. 
We have yet to see whether courts will be similarly willing to 
constrain the President’s authority to limit procedural protections for 
noncitizens charged with removability or expand the detention of 
noncitizens without a bond hearing pending deportation proceedings, 
for example. Contemporary immigration jurisprudence suggests that 
they will not. In these ways, the non-delegation theory falls short of 
the ultimate goal of protecting noncitizens’ rights. 
2. Close Judicial Scrutiny Regardless of Immigrants’ Interests 
Finally, even when a given immigration decision is made by an 
agency official, the denial of plenary power to such decisions pursuant 
to the non-delegation theory will not necessarily coincide with 
noncitizens’ interests. That is, close judicial scrutiny may be as likely 
to reverse an agency decision protecting noncitizens as those harming 
them. 
To be sure, most cases denying plenary power to agency officials 
have ultimately ruled in favor of noncitizens’ interests. But that 
coincidence may be due to the structure of immigration 
decisionmaking. Most immigration cases litigated in federal court are 
brought by noncitizens who have been denied an immigration benefit 
such as admission, release from detention, or relief from removal. A 
grant of immigration benefits, by contrast, would not be appealed to 
federal court unless there is an intra-branch conflict, in which the 
prosecutorial arm of the executive branch (typically from 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement) disagrees with the decision 
of the adjudicative arm of the executive branch (typically the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review). As officials from both 
agencies ultimately answer to the President, such intra-branch 
disagreements are relatively infrequent. Where they do occur, 
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however, a retreat from plenary power rooted in non-delegation 
principles may result in as much judicial skepticism toward agency 
decisions that promote an alien’s interests as toward those that 
compromise such interests. 
The lower court decisions enjoining the Obama administration’s 
deferred action programs demonstrate that administrative decisions 
favoring noncitizens may be as susceptible to judicial reversal as those 
disfavoring them. In November 2014, Secretary of Homeland Security 
Jeh Johnson issued a memorandum directing immigration officials to 
grant “deferred action” providing temporary relief from deportation 
and work authorization to millions of unauthorized aliens who were 
either brought to the United States as children or were parents of 
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residence.287 Twenty-five states filed 
suit to enjoin the policy, and in February of 2015, the District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas granted a preliminary injunction to 
enjoin implementation of the program. In doing so, it emphasized 
that it was not reviewing the power of the President himself, but 
rather the scope of power delegated to the administrative agency.288 
As such, the court concluded that the States were likely to succeed on 
the merits of their claim that the policy was required to undergo 
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures set forth in the APA in 
order to take effect.289 
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statements to the contrary, there are no executive orders or other presidential 
proclamations or communique that exist regarding DAPA. The DAPA Memorandum 
issued by Secretary Johnson is the focus in this suit.”), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), 
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).  
 289. See id. at 676. See generally Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens 
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.290 It agreed that the agency 
violated the procedural requirements of the APA and went further to 
hold that the policy was substantively invalid.291 Concluding that even 
if the Chevron framework applied, the deferred action policy was not 
entitled to deference because it was “manifestly contrary” to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.292 In this case, then, the lower 
courts exercised close judicial scrutiny pursuant to ordinary 
administrative law standards to reverse an administrative immigration 
policy designed to protect aliens. These opinions suggest that under a 
non-delegation theory of plenary power, judicial review over the 
immigration decisions of agency officials may be as likely to harm 
noncitizens’ interests as to promote them. 
CONCLUSION 
The much-maligned plenary power doctrine, which categorically 
insulated immigration decisions from ordinary standards of judicial 
scrutiny, has been in decline. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this 
retreat may be less rooted in judicial solicitude toward noncitizens’ 
rights than a growing concern regarding the breadth of policymaking 
power exercised by our nation’s administrative agencies. This 
observation sheds new light on the scope and limits of the plenary 
power doctrine today. It suggests that courts will retreat from plenary 
power principles to exercise meaningful judicial scrutiny over 
immigration decisions made by agency officials, which constitute the 
vast majority of immigration decisions today. However, plenary 
power principles appear to remain intact to insulate immigration 
decisions rendered directly by Congress or the President from 
meaningful review. Moreover, even where the relevant decisionmaker 
is an administrative official, close scrutiny over immigration decisions 
may be as likely to reverse policies designed to protect noncitizens’ 
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